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Atkins v. Virginia at Twenty: Still
Adaptive Deficits, Still in the
Developmental Period
Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume & Brendan Van Winkle *
Abstract
Twenty years ago, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
states from executing persons with intellectual disability. While the
Court’s decision is laudable and has saved many of the most
vulnerable persons from the executioner, its effect has been
undermined by recalcitrant states attempting to exploit language in
the opinion permitting states to create procedures to implement the
(then) new categorical prohibition. In this article, we examine how
some states have adopted procedures which are fundamentally
inconsistent with the clinical consensus understanding of the
disability and how one state, Georgia, has through the use of juries
and a crippling burden of proof, rendered Atkins a nullity.
Although the Court has intervened to prohibit some of these
practices, it has not granted certiorari to consider others, including
Georgia’s. And due to limits the Court has put on federal habeas
corpus relief, many persons who fall within the Court’s categorical
bar prohibiting persons with intellectual disability from being
sentenced to death or executed, have no effective state or federal
remedy.
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I. Introduction
In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, 1 the United States Supreme
Court held that persons with intellectual disability could not be
executed. 2 The Court determined that imposing the ultimate
1. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding that the execution of intellectually
disabled individuals convicted of capital offenses is unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual punishment).
2. See id. at 310 (describing the rationale the court used to support the
holding). At the time of the Atkins’ decision, intellectual disability was referred to
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punishment on individuals with intellectual disability was
disproportionate and thus was cruel and unusual punishment
barred by the Eighth Amendment. 3 But it continues to happen.
This article examines how recalcitrant state courts and
legislatures, relying primarily upon a single, ill-advised sentence
in the Atkins decision, have created procedural and substantive
obstacles that often effectively nullify the constitutional ban and
how the federal courts, often equally recalcitrant, have, for the
most part, refused to intervene.
State pushback against Atkins has come in different forms.
Some states placed the decision in the hands of juries, which
essentially never find a capital defendant to be a person with
intellectual disability. 4 One state, Georgia, not only gives the
decision to the jury, but it also requires the defendant to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he (and virtually always, he not
she) is a person with intellectual disability. 5 Not surprisingly, no
Georgia defendant has been able to do so. 6 Other states have
limited Atkins’s effect by modifying the definition of intellectual
disability to make it more difficult to prove. Florida, for example,
established a hard IQ score cutoff of seventy, and if a defendant
did not have an IQ score of seventy or below, the intellectual

as mental retardation. We will use the current term, intellectual disability, unless
we are quoting a source that refers to the disability as “mental retardation.”
3. See id. at 321 (“[T]he Constitution places a substantive restriction on the
State’s power to take the life of [an individual with intellectual disabilities who is
convicted of a capital offense].”).
4. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Paul Marcus, & Emily Paavola,
A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 394 (2014)
(describing how juries are used as a tool by states to nullify the Atkins decision).
5. See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (“‘Mentally ill’ means having a
disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
However, the term ‘mental illness’ shall not include a mental state manifested
only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.”).
6. See Disability Rights Groups, Legal Experts, and Conservative Advocates
Urge Supreme Court to Strike Down Georgia’s Uniquely Harsh Proof
Requirements in Death-Penalty Intellectual Disability Cases, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2022) (“Since Georgia adopted the standard in 1988, neither
Young nor any other defendant tried for intentional murder has ever been able to
satisfy it.”) [https://perma.cc/59B7-JEK9].
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disability assertion failed as a matter of law. 7 Similarly, Texas
established additional factors (beyond the clinical criteria) that a
person claiming intellectual disability would have to prove to
prevail. 8 Neither Florida’s nor Texas’s deviation from the agreed
upon, long-standing definition of intellectual disability had any
support in the scientific and medical understanding of the
disorder. 9 Their only purpose was to defeat otherwise meritorious
claims. The Supreme Court intervened to fix some of these state
deviations, but it has refused to apply them to cases decided before
the high court’s intervention. 10
After having their claims rejected by the state courts, these
same persons turn to the federal courts for redress. And there,
many strong claims of intellectual disability also lose, most often
do so as a result of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)’s “limitation on relief,” 11
which requires federal courts to defer to even clearly erroneous
state court decisions unless they are so unreasonable that no
“fairminded jurist” would agree with the state court’s decision
rejecting the death sentenced inmate’s claim of intellectual
disability. 12 This “extreme malfunction” requirement and other
aspects of habeas corpus law, including that the state court
decision must be objectively unreasonable under “clearly
7. See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712–13 (Fla. 2007) (declining to find
that a defendant with an IQ of 72 and “subveraverage intellectual functioning”
was intellectually disabled).
8. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (denying
the applicant’s contention that he was entitled to a jury determination of
intellectual disability; finding instead, that IQ tests of 72 and 74 did not meet the
preponderance of evidence standard required for the applicant to assert an
intellectual disability).
9. See id. (underscoring that Texas and Florida both utilized IQ metrics in
a manner not in accordance with the recommendations of the scientific and
medical community).
10. See Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504, 509 (2019) (explaining that Atkins did
not provide an explicit mechanicsm for determining intellectual disabilities and
that the defendant may not use Moore as clearly established law because it
decided after the court decided the defendant’s claim).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person . . . shall not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the
claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . .”).
12. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (providing the
standard for limitation on relief) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541. U.S. 652,
664 (2004)).
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established” Supreme Court law at the time of the state court
decision, both encourage state recalcitrance and have doomed
many meritorious claims of intellectual disability. 13
By no means are we saying that Atkins has been a complete
failure; far from it. A significant number of people with intellectual
disability have been removed from death row or spared the death
penalty because of Atkins categorical ban. 14 Those numbers
continue to rise. However, the glass is only half-full, as many other
persons that should be ineligible for the death penalty have had
their assertions of intellectual disability rejected. 15 Without
greater judicial or legislative commitment to enforcing the
underlying Atkins right, which currently seems unlikely, the
uneven enforcement of the prohibition against executing persons
with intellectual disability will continue rendering the death
penalty, at least for this category of offenders, arbitrary and
capricious.
After describing the Atkins decision in Part I, 16 we will
examine in more detail some of the procedural roadblocks that
states use to limit Atkins’ reach in Part II. 17 Part III will explore
several significant substantive deviations from the clinical
consensus definition of intellectual disability which have resulted
in the execution of persons with intellectual disability, and
describe how continued state recalcitrance after corrective
Supreme Court decisions. 18 We finish our review of the roadblocks
to Atkins implementation in Part IV by explaining why federal

13. See id. at 102–03 (“Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus
is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’
not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”) (quoting Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
14. See Blume et al., supra note 4 (explaining that the Atkins categorical ban
successfully spared a number of intellectually disabled individuals from capital
punishment).
15. See id. at 399 (articulating that the Atkins categorical ban falls short of
complete success because it leaves room for states to modify their definitions of
intellectual disability making it more difficult for individuals who are typically
considered to have intellectual disabilities to successfully assert Eighth
Amendment claims).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.

60

29 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 55 (2022)

habeas corpus has been an inadequate backstop for state
recalcitrance. 19
II. Atkins v. Virginia: The Creation of the Categorical Ban
More than twenty-five years ago, Daryl Atkins was charged
with capital murder in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 20 Because
of an initial state appellate reversal, he was twice convicted and
twice sentenced to death. 21 At both trials and in both appeals to
the Virginia Supreme Court, Atkins maintained that he could not
be sentenced to death because he was a person with intellectual
disability and that the execution of any person with intellectual
disability violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. 22 There was, however, one significant
obstacle to Atkins’ legal arguments: the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh. 23
Johnny Paul Penry, a Texas death row inmate, had made the
same claim more than a decade earlier. 24 When his case reached
the Supreme Court, a majority of its members surveyed state
practices, identified only a handful of death penalty jurisdictions
that barred capital punishment for persons with mental
retardation, and concluded there was no national consensus
barring the practice. 25 Because the identification of such a
consensus was a necessary prerequisite to finding that the
execution of a particular category of offenders was cruel and
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (describing key facts
related to the Atkins case).
21. See
Lauren
Brasher, Constitutional
Law-Eighth
AmendmentConstraints on the Execution of the Mentally Incompetent. Madison v. Alabama,
139 S. Ct. 718 (2019), 50 CUMB. L. REV. 249, 254–55 (2020) (providing a brief
summary of the procedural facts associated with Atkins’ claim).
22. See Mark E. Olive, The Daryl Atkins Story, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
363, 365 (2014) (stating that Daryl Atkins was charged with murder in 1996).
23. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (concluding that the
Eighth Amendment does not categorically bar death sentences for individuals
with intellectual disabilities).
24. See id. at 306–07 (describing the circumstances surrounding Penry’s
conviction).
25. See id. at 335 (explaining the status of national consensus for barring
capital punishment for the individuals with intellectual disabilities).
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unusual, the Court rejected Penry’s claim. 26 Thus, both before and
after Penry, the legal significance of a capital defendant being a
person with intellectual disability was left to the states; many of
which, in turn, left it to juries to consider in individual cases
whether it amounted to a good enough reason to ultimately spare
the defendant’s life. 27
Working in Atkins’s favor, however, was that after Penry state
legislatures began banning the death penalty for people with
intellectual disability. 28 Thus, after the Virginia Supreme Court
rejected Atkins’s contention that his death sentence was
inconsistent with the “evolving standards of decency” that inform
the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment ban, the
Supreme Court of the United State granted his petition for a writ
of certiorari to determine, for a second time, whether persons with
intellectual disability could be sentenced to death. 29 A six-to-three
majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, ultimately
concluded the Eighth Amendment prohibited doing so. 30
The Court’s decision in Atkins has been widely discussed and
thus for the purposes of this article, only a relatively brief

26. See id. (explaining that the Court rejected Penry’s claim because there
was no national consensus on barring capital punishment for individuals with
intellectual disabilities).
27. David L. Faigman, Emily V. Shaw, & Nicholas Scurich, Intellectual
Disability, The Death Penalty, and Jurors, 58 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 441–42 (2018)
(explaining how capital cases for people with intellectual disabilities are
adjudicated).
28. See Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002) (providing a timeline
for when state legislators effectuated bans on the death penalty for people with
intellectual disabilities).
29. The Court first granted certiorari in McCarver v. North Carolina, 548
S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941 (2001), a North Carolina case
that also asked the Court to revisit Penry and declare that executing persons with
mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment. Pursuant to long standing
Supreme Court practice, Atkins’s case was “held” by the Court while it decided
the North Carolina case. However, the Court replaced McCarver with Atkins v.
Virginia after North Carolina passed a statute barring the execution of persons
with mental retardation thus making the McCarver case moot. See Olive supra
note 22, at 365–66 (describing pre-Atkins cases).
30. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (2002) (explaining that the culmination of
Atkins’ second writ of certiorari was a determination that the eighth amendment
prohibited capital punishment for the intellectually disabled).
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summary of the Court’s reasoning is necessary. 31 After reiterating
that proportionality, as measured by current standards, was an
integral part of any Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court stated
that the most “objective” and “reliable” evidence of whether the
death penalty was an excessive (and thus disproportionate)
punishment for persons with intellectual disability would be found
in state legislative enactments and jury verdicts. 32 Then, in the
course of reviewing the legislative landscape at the time, the Court
observed that while at the time it decided Penry, only two death
penalty states and the federal government prohibited the death
penalty for offenders with intellectual disability, since that time,
an additional sixteen states had taken death off the punishment
table for this category of persons. 33 Moreover, the Court noted, “i[t]
is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but
the consistency of the direction of change.” 34 Given “the wellknown . . . [popularity of] anticrime legislation,” the Court
believed that this trend was “powerful evidence that today our
society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.” 35 The Court also observed
that even in those states that retained the death penalty for
persons with intellectual disability, only a small handful had
actually executed a person with intellectual disability in the post31. For a more detailed discussion of Penry and Atkins, see Marc J. Tassé &
John H. Blume, Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty: Current Issues and
Controversies, Chapter 2 (2018) (noting the relevance of the Atkins decision to this
article).
32. According to the Atkins majority, the core Eighth Amendment concept is
the “dignity of man” and thus, its constitutional content must be informed by “the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12 (explaining that the most objective and reasonable
evidence of whether the death penality is an excessive punishment for persons
with intellectual disability can be found from legislative enactiments and jury
verdicts).
33. See id. at 314–15 (providing historical background and showing that
more and more states are rejecting the death penalty on people who deal with
mental illness).
34. See id. at 315 (stating that times are changing and that more states are
agreeing on being against the death penalty for people who have intellectual
disabilities).
35. See id. at 315–16 (emphasizing the fact that there is a growing trend in
even our society that metnally ill people are shown more sympathy than the
average criminal).
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Penry era. 36 Taking all of this into account, including the opinions
of social and professional organizations with “germane expertise,”
the Court concluded that “a national consensus has developed”
against executing persons with intellectual disability. 37
As it had done when creating other bars to execution for
categories of offenders or offenses, the Court then brought its own
judgment to bear as to whether to accept the consensus. 38 It first
looked to the “relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders,”
in view of the penological purposes served by the death penalty. 39
After noting that persons with intellectual disability “have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and
to understand the reactions of others,” the Court concluded that
neither justification advanced by states in support of the death
penalty—retribution and deterrence—were served by permitting
their execution. 40 Thus, the Court accepted the consensus as
legitimate and held that the Constitution “places a substantive
restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally
retarded offender.” 41

36. See id. at 316 (observing that states that still sentenced the death
penalty to people of intellectual disabilities had a difficult time sentencing those
people to death).
37. See id. at 317 (reiterating the fact that there are growing concern about
sentencing people with intelectual disability).
38. See id. (explaining that the Court took matters in own hands and made
a decision).
39. See id. (examining the first step of the consensus that States have
developed).
40. See id. at 318. Because retribution “depends on the culpability of the
offender,” the Court found that the death penalty, society’s most extreme
punishment, was excessive due to the “lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender.” Id. at 319. The Court also concluded that deterrence interests are not
served by the execution of offenders with intellectual disabilities because “capital
punishment can [only] serve as a deterrent when [a crime] is the result of
premeditation and deliberation,” and the threat of death “will inhibit criminal
actors from carrying out murderous conduct,” but that this type “of calculus is at
the opposite end of the spectrum from [the] behavior of [the] mentally retarded”
due to their cognitive and behavioral impairments. Id. at 319–320.
41. See id. at 321 (emphasizing that the Court and the Constitution accepted
the consensus and restricted States from taking the life of a mentally ill offender).
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Two other aspects of the Atkins decision are worth noting
before turning to the Court’s more recent decisions in this area.
First, on the positive side of the ledger, the Court did, at least
implicitly, embrace clinical definitions of intellectual disability and
scientific means of assessing intellectual functioning. In footnote
three of the majority opinion—in the course of discussing the trial
evidence that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded”—Justice
Stevens relied upon both the American Association on Mental
Retardation (“AAMR”) and the American Psychiatric Association’s
(“APA”) virtually identical definitions of mental retardation set
forth in Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification and
Systems of Supports 5 (9th Ed. 1992) and the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Forty-One (4th Ed. 2000)
respectively. 42 Both definitions included the clinically accepted
three prongs: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning;
existing concurrently with (2) significant limitations in adaptive
functioning; and (3) manifestation or onset prior to the age of
eighteen. 43
Second, the Court observed that “[t]o the extent there is
serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded.” 44 Noting that the Commonwealth disputed that Atkins
“suffers from mental retardation,” the Court concluded as it had
done in a different death penalty context when it created a
categorical bar to the execution of persons who were insane or
incompetent at the time of their execution, “‘we leave to the
State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’” 45 As

42. See id. at 308 n.3 (stating that a Justice Stevens relied on different
sources such as the “AAMR” and “APA” to define and classify whether a person
was mentally ill).
43. See id. at 318 (providing the three prongs that determine whether a
person is mentally ill).
44. See id. (stating another aspect of the Atkins decision where the Court
must determine whether a person was actually mentally ill).
45. See id. at 317 (stating that it is up to the states to create a system on
whether to execute people with mental illness) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
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we have previously observed, this was an extremely unfortunate
choice of language. 46
III. State Procedural Obstacles to Realizing Atkins’ Protection
When the Supreme Court held in Atkins that the execution of
a person with intellectual disability 47 violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, it could
have mandated procedures for implementing this categorial
exemption, but did not do so. To what extent the Supreme Court
accompanies the announcement of a new constitutional right with
a description of mandated procedures states must use to enforce
that right has varied significantly. At one extreme lies Miranda v.
Arizona, 48 where the extension of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination to police interrogation faced
obvious and substantial risks misinterpretation and resistance;
there, the Court’s opinion supplied extraordinarily detailed
instructions regarding its implementation. 49 At the other extreme
are cases where the application of a right is likely to be so
straightforward, and so little open to dispute that opinion
46. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, & Christopher Seeds, “Of
Atkins and Men” Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in
Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J. OF L. & PUB. POLICY 689, 691 (2009)
(acknowledging the fact that using the word “retarded” or any forms of that word
is out of date and unprofessional).
47. Atkins established a categorical exemption for persons with “mental
retardation,” the term professionals employed when Atkins was decided, but after
the professional terminology shifted to “intellectual disability,” the Court followed
the professional convention. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014)
(“Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term ‘mental retardation.’
This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical
phenomenon.”).
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (holding that “an
individual . . . must be clearly informed [of his] right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation . . . protecting [his]
privilege . . . with the warnings of the right to remain silent [as anything] can be
used in evidence against him.”).
49. See e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (stating that a
prosecutor’s racially motivated exercise of the peremptory challenge violates the
Equal Protection Clause and establishing a three-step process for determining
the presence of racial motivation); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436 (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination extends to
police interrogation and setting forth detailed warnings police must give to
protect that privilege).
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establishing the right doesn’t even refer to how that right will be
implemented. 50 In between lie cases where the Court insists upon
some procedures but leaves others for the states to determine; for
example, when the Court held that a prosecutor’s racially
motivated exercise of the peremptory challenge violates the Equal
Protection Clause, it specified a three step procedure for
ascertaining whether the challenge was racially motivated, but
explicitly declined to dictate what remedial measures a court
should take if it found racial motivation. 51 The Atkins opinion
acknowledges the question of procedures, but, as noted earlier,
explicitly declines to specify any at all, stating, “As was our
approach in Ford v. Wainwright . . . with regard to insanity [at the
time of execution] ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
[their] execution of sentences.’” 52
Whether abstaining from imposing implementing procedures
in Ford was wise is a question for another day (it wasn’t), but it
should have been obvious to the Court that there were at least two
significant differences between Ford and Atkins. First, one would
expect less resistance to the Court’s holding in Ford because—
unlike a bar against executing persons with intellectual
disability—”[t]he bar against executing a prisoner who has lost his
sanity bears impressive historical credentials; the practice
consistently has been branded “savage and inhuman.” 53 Second,
the significance of procedural options available for determination
of intellectual disability are much greater; in particular, both the
50. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004) (concluding that the
Eighth Amendment forbids execution for an offense committed before the
defendant was eighteen years of age without discussion of implementation).
51. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24 (“[W]e express no view on whether it is
more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of discrimination against
black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from
a panel not previously associated with the case.”).
52. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (reiterating the fact that
the Supreme Court allows states to create a way to handle the death penalty
situation dealing with mentally ill people) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 405 (1986)).
53. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (citing 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24–*25) (explaining that the practice of executing
a prisoner who has lost his sanity is not only unjust but also different from
executing a prisoner with intellectual disability).
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timing of the determination and training of the decisionmaker are
up for grabs only in the intellectual disability determination. 54
Third, the Ford determination is factually much simpler; most
notably, it requires an evaluation of present capacity, rather than
a retrospective assessment of limitations that existed during the
developmental period (as the third prong of intellectual disability
requires), a period that for some defendants ended decades
earlier. 55
Twenty years of Atkins litigation has demonstrated the
significance of these differences between Atkins and Ford
determinations. 56 In particular, two procedural choices that stem
from these differences—the choice of some states to assign juries
the determination of intellectual disability and the decision of one
state to impose an impossible-to-satisfy burden of proof—combined
with the Supreme Court’s disinterest in considering the
shortcomings of procedures selected by the states, have thwarted
many meritorious Atkins claims. 57
A. Jury Decisionmaking
Whether because Ford determinations occur long after the
convicting jury has been dismissed, or because of the deep
historical roots of the prohibition against the execution of the
54. See id. at 413 (stating that having procedural options available for
determining intellectual disability is important because the timing of the
determination and training of the decisionmaker may be a violation of the
offender’s Eighth Amendment right).
55. The determination of intellectual disability, even when made during the
developmental period, is also more complicated because the second prong of an
intellectual disability diagnosis, significant adaptive functioning deficits, may be
demonstrated in a multitude of ways. See id. at 414 (describing the difficulties
factfinders face in resolving differences in the presentation of disabilities and
psychiatric opinions).
56. See Cynthia A. Orpen, Following in the Footsteps of Ford: Mental
Retardation and Capital Punishment Post-Atkins, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 97 (2003)
(explaining the significance of the differences between Atkins and Ford
determinations, such as burden of proof, appellate procedures, classification, and
diagnosis).
57. See id. at 95–97 (examining procedural inconsistencies and differences
between Atkins and Ford determinations and the Supreme Court’s disinterest in
the ineffectiveness of the procedures implemented by the states have belittled the
outcome of the Atkins claims).
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insane, no state has ever attempted to relegate Ford
determinations to juries, and early Atkins determinations also
were uniformly assigned to judges. 58 Not surprisingly, states that
prior to Atkins had no prohibition against the execution of person
with intellectual disability were soon confronted with significant
(albeit not overwhelming) 59 numbers of Atkins claims by death row
inmates sentenced to death prior to Atkins. All states elected to
have such claims decided by judges, sometimes on remand from
the state supreme court and sometimes in postconviction
proceedings. 60 The obvious reason behind this unanimity
paralleled one to the reasons for the unanimous selection of judges
as the adjudicators of Ford claims: It would be expensive and timeconsuming to impanel juries solely for the purpose of determining
intellectual disability. 61
But the adjudication of Atkins claims for capital defendants
not yet tried was a closer question, one more complicated than that
posed with respect to Ford claims. 62 In capital cases tried after
Atkins, the savings to be made by assigning the Atkins
determination to a judge were still significant, but notably smaller
than in cases where the trial had already been completed; in such
cases, judicial pretrial determination of Atkins ineligibility would
58. See id. at 100–01 (explaining that the complexity involved in the
consideration of whether or not someone facing the death penalty is intellectually
disabled has motivated states to rely almost exclusively on judges to make these
decisions).
59. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Atkins warned of a risk that decision would
generate an overwhelming number of frivolous claims. It has not done so. Seven
percent of all death row inmates have filed Atkins claim. See John H. Blume et
al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases,
76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 628 (2009) (reporting that six years after Atkins,
approximately seven percent of death row inmates had filed Atkins claims);
Blume et al., supra note 4, at 396 (reporting that twelve years after Atkins, less
than eight percent of potentially eligible death row inmates had filed Atkins
claims).
60. See Blume et al., supra note 4, at 410 (finding that for pre-Atkins claims,
all states elected to have a judge make the determination).
61. See id. (explaining that impaneling of a jury is costly, and there is a
likelihood of reversible error inherent in a jury proceeding thus the unanimous
choice is not surprising).
62. See id. at 400 (analyzing Atkins claims to understand how and why
claims of intellectual disability are rejected and noting that 52% of all
unsuccessful Atkins claimants lost on all three prongs of the test for intellectual
disability).
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avoid waste only in cases where the Atkins claim proved to be
meritorious, and in such cases, would not save the entire cost of
impaneling a jury, but would be limited to saving the enhanced
costs of proceeding with a capital trial rather than a noncapital
one. 63 In addition to these possible savings, a legislature or court
determining whether judges or juries should make Atkins
decisions might weigh in favor of judicial determinations the
likelihood that judges would develop some Atkins expertise and
therefore make better decisions. 64 On the other hand, a legislature
might prefer jury determinations because they elevate common
sense over expertise and preserve the community’s will over the
judiciary; 65 such a preference can be defended as constitutionallyinformed, for in our judicial system, jury trials are not “mere[ly a]
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in
our constitutional structure.” 66 Relatedly, but less admirably,
legislators might prefer jury determination of intellectual
disability because they predicted that juries would be more
hesitant to exempt murderers from the death penalty and more
willing to disregard the testimony of experts when that testimony
fails to comport with their beliefs. 67 Such a prediction, however,
was far from certain, given that previous empirical studies
generally found that judges and juries mostly agreed, and when
they disagreed, juries were more lenient, 68 a pattern that is
63. See Blume et al., supra note 4, at 410 (“[J]udicial determination
of intellectual disability would have obviated the need for impaneling a jury, or
at least permitted the impaneling of a non-capital-jury a much less costly
process.”).
64. See id. at 411 (noting that judges are more able than jurors to set aside
their feelings and correctly apply a legal standard).
65. See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2019) (applying
jury determination); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343–
44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that having the right to a jury
trial preserves the people’s authority over the government’s judicial functions).
66. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (giving
intelligible content to the right of jury trial).
67. See Blume et al., supra note 4, at 411 (noting that jurors are harsher in
determinations of intellectual disability because they typically cannot set aside
their feelings when it comes to heinous crimes).
68. See id. (finding that when there are disagreements between juries and
judges during criminal cases, juries are likely to be more lenient) (citing NEIL
VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 148–51 (2007)); see
also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A

70

29 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 55 (2022)

especially pronounced in capital sentencing. 69 Not surprisingly,
given both competing predictions and countervailing interests,
some states chose to assign Atkins determinations to judges and
some chose to assign them to juries. 70
Ten states (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and

Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 171, 173 (2005) (noting that juries are more likely to exhibit leniency in
criminal cases); see also Valerie P. Hans et al., The Hung Jury: The American
Jury’s Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 22–23, 33
(2003); see Valerie P. Hans, What Difference Do Juries Make in Empirical Studies
of Judicial Systems? 105 (K.C. Huang ed., 2009).
69. See Michael Radelet, Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations in
Florida Capital Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 793, 828–33 (2011) (reporting 166 judicial overrides of jury life sentences in
Florida); see also Equal Justice Initiative, The Death Penalty in Alabama:
Judicial Override (July 2011) (“Since 1976, Alabama judges have overridden jury
verdicts 107 times. In 92% of over-rides elected judges have overruled jury
verdicts of life to impose the death penalty. Twenty-one percent of the 199 people
currently on Alabama’s death row were sentenced to death through judicial
override.”) [https://perma.cc/2PB3-TYNZ].
70. See Blume et al., supra note 4, at 411 (showing that state legislatures
who choose jury determinations are correct in believing that juries will be more
reluctant to find intellectual disability).
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Virginia) elected juries, 71 two of which (New Mexico 72 and
Virginia 73) have since abolished the death penalty. One
(California) gives a choice to the defendant, 74 and one (South
Carolina) requires a pretrial judicial determination, and in the
event the judge finds no intellectual disability, allows the
defendant to argue the issue to the jury in the penalty phase. 75 The
remaining seventeen death penalty states (Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Utah) 76 as well as the federal and military courts,
71. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(a) (1975) (giving the option for the sentencing
hearing to be conducted before a trial judge without a jury or before a trial judge
and a jury); see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(d)(2)(B)(i) (1993) (permitting the
defendant to raise the question of an intellectual disability to the jury for
determination de novo during the sentencing phase of the trial); see LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2003) (calling for jury to try the issue of intellectual
disability of the capital defendant during the capital sentencing hearing unless
the state and the defendant agree that the issue is to be tried by the judge); see
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2005(e) (2001) (calling for the court to submit a
special issue to the jury as to whether the defendant has an intellectual
disability); see OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 701.106(E) (2006) (electing for jury
determination of intellectual disability); see PA. R. CRIM. P. 844(B) (explaining
that upon completion of an argument, the jury shall decides the issue of the
defendant’s intellectual disability); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (2003)
(calling for the jury determination when it comes to deciding intellectual
disability); see also Rogers v. State, 653 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2007) (electing jury to
determine whether the defendant was intellectually disabled); see also State v.
Flores, 93 P.3d 1264 (N.M. 2004) (relying on the jury to determine whether the
defendant was intellectually disabled); see also Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (assigning the jury the responsibility to determine
whether the defendant had an intellectual disability).
72. See H.B. 285, 49th Leg., 1st Sess., Section 6 (N.M. 2009) (abolishing the
death penalty in New Mexico) [https://perma.cc/PXP8-HM29].
73. See VA CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1, repealed by Abolition of the Death
Penalty Act of 2021, ch. 344, 345, HB 2263 (abolishing the death penalty in
Virginia).
74. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(1) (West 2003) (allowing the defendant,
at a reasonable time, prior to the start of trial, to apply for an order directing that
a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted).
75. See Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. 2003) (explaining
that the defendant may argue the issue to the jury in the penalty phase if the
judge finds that the defendant does not have an intellectual disability).
76. See Neil Vigdor, Colorado Abolishes Death Penalty And Commutes
Sentences of Death Row Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020) (showing that
Colorado, New Jersey, and New York have since abolished the death penalty)
[https://perma.cc/9J2A-23EF]); see also Death Penalty Information Center, State
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chose judges, though four of those states (Colorado, Illinois, New
Jersey, and New York) have since abolished the death penalty. 77
If the ten states that opted for jury determination did so
betting that juries would minimize the number of defendants
found to be Atkins ineligible, they won, and won big. 78 When we
counted cases in 2014, we estimated that juries had rejected
intellectual disability in 96 percent of the cases; in twenty two of
twenty three cases, the claims had failed. 79 Moreover, the only
Atkins jury win likely succeeded because of the legally incorrect
instruction that to sentence the defendant to death, the jury had
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not a person with
intellectual disability. 80 In the eight years since we wrote that
article, there have been no cases in which Atkins claims have
prevailed in front of juries. All told, there are now at least 42 Atkins
jury losses, and only one win. 81 A closer look is even more
discouraging; in Louisiana, where eight Atkins claims have been
presented to juries, not only have none succeeded, but not a single
juror has cast a life vote in a case where intellectual disability was
raised under the statute. 82
While there are a variety of ways to calculate success rates in
front of judges (should all judicial determinations be counted? only
by State (listing the states that retain the death penalty—among them: Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Utah)
[https://perma.cc/YSR8-RVYY].
77. See Death Penalty Information Center, State and Federal Info: New
Jersey (detailing that there is no death penalty in New Jersey)
[https://perma.cc/AA6D-4BXS]; see also Death Penalty Information Center, State
and Federal Info: New York (explaining that New York does not have the death
penalty) [https://perma.cc/S4ZT-3HEP].
78. See generally Blume et al., supra note 4.
79. See id. at 411 (asserting that juries are more reluctant to find an
intellectual disability).
80. See id. (highlighting that Georgia requires proof of intellectual disability
beyond a reasonable doubt).
81. Although we are almost certainly missing some Atkins losses, we are
confident that if there were another win, we would know about it, because we
monitor several death penalty listserves and because Justice 360, with which the
Cornell Death Penalty Project has formal ties, collects data on Atkins cases. See
generally JUSTICE 360 [https://perma.cc/S36N-T57M ].
82. See Correspondence with Richard Bourke, Director of the Louisiana
Capital Assistance Center (on file with author).
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pretrial determinations be included? only those found in reported
cases?), it is plain that win rates are wildly higher in judge cases;
depending on how they are calculated, overall win rates in judge
cases range from fourteen to twenty times greater in jury cases––
even counting that one idiosyncratic jury win. 83 Or to make a
jurisdiction-specific comparison, no Texas jury has ever spared a
capital defendant’s life based on an Atkins claim, but in postconviction proceedings where judges adjudicate Atkins claims,
twenty-two people have been removed from Texas’s death row
because they have been found to have an intellectual disability. 84
Finally, once prosecutors know that juries are reluctant to find an
intellectual disability, they may be less likely to accept pleas to life
sentences from worthy Atkins claimants in jury-determination
states than in judge-determination states. 85
Why are jurors, even in cases where the evidence is crystal
clear, so resistant to finding a capital defendant intellectually
disabled? In a previous article, two of us offered two hypotheses:
Either that “in the context of a horrible crime-judges are more able
to set aside their feelings and correctly apply a legal standard than
jurors,” or that “juries determine intellectual disability after
hearing all of the evidence in aggravation, including victim impact
evidence as compared to judges, who generally make pretrial
rulings of intellectual disability and consequently have been
exposed to fewer emotional, retributive triggers.” 86 Were the
second reason most important, it might be ameliorated by moving
the jury determination to a pretrial proceedings, though no state
in fact has done so. But as it turns out, subsequent research points
to jurors’ lesser ability to put aside horrible crime facts to
accurately apply a legal standard predominant cause as the
83. See Blume et al., supra note 4, at 411 (exemplifying all the win-loss data
at the end of 2013 which demonstrates that defendants are more likely to win a
case for intellectual disability in judge cases than jury cases).
84. See Intellectual Disability Reversals Under Atkins, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER [https://perma.cc/97C9-FBL4] (noting how Texas courts
have adjudicated Atkins claims by capital defendants).
85. See Blume et al., supra note 4, at 410–11 (asserting that since juries are
more likely to determine that the defendant does not have an intellectual
disability, it will be less likely for prosecutors to have a reason to cooperate with
defendants during the plea bargaining stage).
86. See id. at 411–12 (determining that judges are more capable of setting
aside their feelings and correctly applying the legal standard than jurors).
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predominant cause of the gross disparities win-rates before juries
and those before judges. 87
Setting aside the capital trial context for a moment, when lay
jurors arbitrate intellectual disability claims, they tend to believe
that only persons with extreme impairments are intellectually
disabled. 88 For example, upon hearing that a person lived by
herself and saw a social worker once a month, only 34 percent of
lay persons called for jury service thought this fact was consistent
with a claim that the person had intellectual disability, while 69
percent of mental health workers thought so. 89 Similarly, whereas
only 31 percent of jurors thought the person’s inability to drive
supported her intellectual disability claim, 71 percent of mental
health workers did; 90 potential jurors with limited exposure to
people with intellectual disability were much less likely than
mental health professionals to view only severe impairments as
evidence of intellectual disability. 91
The reader may imagine that such prejudice may be cured by
information from an expert, but both the broader literature on
motivated cognition and our own research on intellectual disability
determinations strongly suggests that it will not. The theory of
motivated cognition posits that when a decisionmaker has a
definite preference for one outcome, where that outcome is
implicated by the resolution of an issue, she may evaluate the issue
based her outcome preferences and then look for evidence that
confirms her judgment, rather that evaluating the evidence
independent of those preferences. 92 Such biased processing of
87. See id. (establishing that jurors are more emotional when it comes to
cases involving violent crimes).
88. See generally, Marcus T. Boccaccini, John W. Clark, Lisa Kan, Beth
Caillouet, & Ramona M. Noland, Jury Pool Members’ Beliefs about the Relation
Between Potential Impairments in Functioning and Mental Retardation:
Implications for Atkins-Type Case, 34 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1 (2010).
89. See id. at 19 (showing the difference between results for mental health
workers and jurors when deciding whether someone has an intellectual
disability).
90. Id. at 22.
91. See id. at 21 (explaining that jurors with limited exposure are less likely
to view severe impairments as evidence of intellectual disability compared to
mental health professionals).
92. See GALEN V. BODENHAUSEN & ALAN J. LAMBERT, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
COGNITION: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. WYER, JR., 213 (Galen V.

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA AT TWENTY

75

evidence is not conscious, and only occurs where there is some
evidence supporting the preferred outcome, but the pervasiveness
of the biased processing where there is mixed evidence is very wellestablished. 93
We conducted two studies (publishing the second, which
confirmed the results of the first) to explore the influence of
motivated cognition on the determination of intellectual
disability. 94 In both, we provided all subjects with IQ testing
results and a social history that established a moderately strong
case of intellectual disability, along with conflicting expert
opinions and accurate instructions describing the criteria for
determining intellectual disability. 95 Half of the subjects, however,
were told that their decision about intellectual disability would
determine whether an applicant would receive disability benefits,
and half were told that it would determine whether a defendant
convicted of a double murder was ineligible for the death penalty. 96
Bodenhausen, Alan J. Lambert eds., 1st ed. 2004) (discussing the effects of
preferred conclusions when it comes to motivated cognition).
93. See e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH.
BULL. 480, 490 (1990) (“[T]hese studies suggest that the evaluation of scientific
evidence may be biased by whether people want to believes it conclusions. But
people are not at liberty to believe anything they like; they are constrained by
their prior beliefs about the acceptability of various procedures.”).
94. See Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., Race, Intellectual Disability, and Death:
An Empirical Inquiry Into Invidious Influences on Atkins Determinations, 66
UCLA L. REV. 1506, 1512–13 (2019) (“In each study, we presented participants
with a vignette and asked them to determine if the subject was a person with
intellectual disability.”).
95. See id. (explaining the information given to participants of the study all
of which could indicate that the subject involved in the benefits or death penalty
case could have an intellectual disability).
96. See id.
Participants were either given a death penalty case or a disability
benefits case. In both situations, participants were instructed that the
criteria for intellectual disability are significant limitations in
intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive behavior,
and onset prior to the age of eighteen. They were also given the same
evidence relating to intellectual disability: the defendant or claimant
failed grades in school, had IQ scores within the range of intellectual
disabilities (between 62 and 72), was unable to hold a job for more than
a few weeks, never had a driver’s license or bank account, never lived
alone, and was unable to cook or manage money. The scenario also
provided other facts about the defendant, including that he played
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As would be predicted by motivated cognition theory, subjects told
that their decision could exempt a murderer from imposition of the
death penalty were significantly less likely to find the existence of
intellectual disability; 81 percent of subjects told that a finding of
intellectual disability would result in the award of benefits found
intellectual disability, but only 50 percent of those told that finding
intellectual disability would preclude imposition of the death
penalty did so. 97 Moreover, participants in the death penalty
condition were far more likely to mention the consequences of their
decision in their responses than participants in the disability
benefits condition—and persons who favored the death penalty
were less likely to find intellectual disability in either condition. 98
The diminishment of intellectual disability findings revealed
by this experiment—about forty percent—almost certainly
understates the effects that motivated cognition would have in real
capital cases. 99 The motivation in this experimental setting is far
smaller than would occur in a real trial for at least two reasons:
The experimental subjects knew their decision would have no real
football and had been previously married, that are within the range of
behaviors that a person with intellectual disability may demonstrate,
but suggest some strengths. Participants were provided with expert
testimony on both sides of the question.
In the death penalty context, the defendant was charged with armed
robbery and double homicide. Participants read a description of the
crime, which included clear evidence of guilt (video footage) and
upsetting details like the murder of a child and a motive of pecuniary
gain. In the disability benefits context, the subject was fired from his
job on his first day. Participants read the benefits available to the
subject if diagnosed with an intellectual disability, which included
supervision, a job, and a supported living placement.
97. See id. at 1513–14 (“In the murder case, only 50 percent of participants
found that the person had an intellectual disability, compared to 81 percent in
the benefits case. This suggests that either the presence of criminal behavior or
consequences of an intellectual disability determination (or both) influence some
jurors’ determination of intellectual disability . . . .”).
98. See id. at 1520 (finding that participants in the death penalty study
“express more concerns about the consequences of their decision”); see id. at 1514
(“Notably, regardless of the context, people who favored the death penalty were
significantly less likely to find than an individual had an intellectual disability.”).
99. See id. (highlighting that the issues surrounding deciding whether
someone has an intellectual disability would be “more salient in a real case”).
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effects, and they were not exposed to nearly as powerful emotional
triggers as they would be in a real case, including gruesome crime
photographs and weeping victim family members. 100 One might
ask whether judges would do better in setting aside their
preferences in evaluating the evidence. Judges certainly are not
completely immune from the general phenomenon of motivated
cognition, 101 but they have vastly more experience dealing with the
emotional aspects of violent crime. 102 Unpublished data collected
by our colleague Jeffrey Rachlinski from sitting judges reveals no
significant differences in their evaluation of intellectual disability
in the capital defendant setting as compared to the benefits
setting. 103 Moreover, data we have gathered from mental health
professionals, another group with professional experience and
training relevant to an Atkins assessment, albeit with a different
expertise, also fail to show differences between capital punishment
and benefits settings. 104
Thus, both the extraordinarily stark statistics from actual jury
determinations of intellectual disability determinations in capital
cases and mock jury studies lead to the same conclusion: Because
jurors are much more influenced by hostility to the capital
defendant than are judges, states nearly eliminate the
constitutional protection provided by Atkins when they make
juries the arbiters of categorical exemption from the death penalty
based on intellectual disability. 105
100. See id. at 1512–13 (explaining that the information participants received
about the crime committed did not include gruesome crime photographs and
participants did not feel the emotional impact of the courtroom).
101. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 812, 814–16 (2001) (discussing
circumstances under which the phenomenon of motivated cognition is observed
with judges).
102. See id. at 782 (explaining that judges are experienced decision-makers).
103. See Jeffrey Rachlinski (unpublished data) (on file with author at Cornell
Law School) (finding that intellectual disability evaluations do not differ between
practice settings).
104. See Amelia Courtney Hritz et al., Death by Expert: Cognitive Bias in the
Diagnosis of Mild Intellectual Disability, 44 L. & PSYCH. REV. 61, 89 (2020) (“We
found that experts diagnosed intellectual disability at nearly identical rates in
the death penalty context and disability context.”).
105. See John H. Blume et al., supra, note 4, at 411 (finding jurors “harsher
in determination of intellectual disability—because—in context of a horrible
crime—judges are more able to set aside their feelings and correctly apply a legal
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Had the Atkins Court consulted the involuntary confession
cases for guidance before it gave procedural carte blanche to the
states, it could have avoided the debacle of near-universal jury
nullification of Atkins in the ten states that opted for jury
determination of intellectual disability. 106 Jackson v. Denno 107 held
that New York’s procedure, which provided the jury with an
instruction to determine the voluntariness of the confession, and
one to ignore the confession’s probative value should the jury
determine it to be involuntary, “did not afford a reliable
determination of the voluntariness of the confession offered in
evidence at the trial, did not adequately protect Jackson’s right to
be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession and
therefore cannot withstand constitutional attack under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 108 Why not? The
Jackson opinion provides reasons which apply equally to jury
determinations of intellectual disability, commenting on what
psychologists would now label motivated cognition:
[T]he jury . . . may find it difficult to understand the policy
forbidding reliance upon a coerced, but true, confession, a policy
which has divided this Court in the past . . . and an issue which
may be reargued in the jury room. That a trustworthy confession
must also be voluntary if it is to be used at all, generates natural
and potent pressure to find it voluntary. Otherwise the guilty
defendant goes free. Objective consideration of the conflicting
evidence concerning the circumstances of the confession becomes
difficult and the implicit findings become suspect. 109
Likewise, a jury charged to determine the defendant’s
intellectual disability may dispute the policy of exemption the
intellectually disabled from the death penalty and feel pressured
standard than jurors . . . it is obvious that jurors are vastly more reluctant to find
intellectual disability than are judges”).
106. See id. at 410 (“Nonetheless, ten states—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Virginia—chose to allocate the determination of intellectual disability in the
post-Atkins cases to juries.”).
107. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964) (finding against New
York’s procedure in determining the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession).
108. See id. (explaining why New York’s procedure violated Jackson’s Due
Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
109. Id. at 381–82.
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to find no intellectual disability lest the defendant escape the death
penalty, rendering “objective consideration of the conflicting
evidence concerning” intellectual disability impossible. 110
These considerations similarly inform who decides other
constitutional rights questions in criminal cases. Juries don’t
decide whether someone violates the Fourth Amendment; a judge
determines whether an unreasonable search or seizure has taken
place and then, following applicable exclusionary rule precedents,
either permits the introduction of the evidence or suppresses it. 111
Juries don’t decide Miranda violations either. 112 Nor do they decide
whether an identification is so unnecessarily suggestive as to
violate the due process clause. 113 To permit juries to make those
kinds of decisions—decisions where the impulse to punish will
often either override the obligation to follow constitutional
constraints, or bias the determination of the application of those
constraints—poses so great a threat to those constraints that it
cannot be tolerated.
B. The Standard of Proof
1. Georgia’s Standard of Proof
The second significant state procedural obstacle to the
realization of Atkins protection has been employed by only one
state, but for the defendants to whom it applies, has proved as
110. See id. at 382 (highlighting the difficulty for jurors to make objective
considerations in cases where, without the coerced confession, there is not enough
evidence to convict).
111. See Bryan H. Ward, Restoring Causality to Attenuation: Establishing the
Breadth of a Fourth Amendment Violation, 124 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 149 (2021)
(explaining that, if there is a Fourth Amendment violation, the judge must “decide
what to do about it”).
112. See John J. Henry, Criminal Procedure-Application of the Harmless
Error Rule to Miranda Violations, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 109, 114 (1992)
(highlighting that the court, and thus the judge, determines whether a Miranda
violation has occurred).
113. See Steven P. Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court’s
Due Process Test Fails to Meet Its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 64–65
(1981) (explaining that judges determine whether an identification violates the
Due Process Clause).
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insurmountable as jury determinations. 114 Under Georgia law—
before and after Atkins—a defendant could “be found ‘guilty but
with intellectual disability’” if the jury, or court acting as trier of
facts, finds “beyond a reasonable doubt” (“BARD”) that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged and is with intellectual
disability.” 115 In the thirty-year history of this statute, no Georgia
capital defendant has ever satisfied this standard. 116
Georgia was the first state to exempt persons with intellectual
disability from capital punishment, an exemption born of outrage
at the execution of a man with an IQ of fifty-nine who could not
count to ten; 117 that this progressive outrage led to a statute that
would become the harshest in the nation is both ironic and tragic.
Today Georgia is the only state in the nation that requires proof of
intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt. 118 Only two
states, Arizona and Florida, require that an Atkins claimant
establish intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence,
and all of the others require only proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. 119

114. See infra Part III.B.1.
115. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3).
116. From our research, it looks like in fact one defendant – a noncapital
defendant -- has satisfied the standard. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, An Empirical
Assessment of Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard to Determine
Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases, 33 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 553, 555 (2017)
(“Only one defendant in Georgia in the statute’s nearly thirty-year history has
been able to successfully prove before a jury that she is intellectually disabled
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
117. Veronica M. O’Grady, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The Constitutionality
of Georgia’s Burden of Proof in Executing the Mentally Retarded, 48 GA. L.
REV. 1189, 1202 (2014).
118. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, supra note 116, at 560–61 nn.22–25 (“Georgia
is . . . the only state that requires a determination of intellectual disability in
tandem with the jury’s consideration of the defendant’s guilt.”).
119. Id. at 561 n.22. Indiana, which like Georgia exempted intellectually
disabled capital defendants from the death penalty prior to Atkins, and like
Georgia then employed a more stringent standard of proof (albeit clear and
convincing evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt). Rogers v. State, 698
N.E.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Ind. 1998), has held that the Supreme Court’s
determination that the exemption is constitutionally compelled requires
replacement of the clear and convincing standard with a preponderance of the
evidence standard. Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 103 (Ind. 2005) (abrogating
Rogers’ clear and convincing evidentiary requirement).

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA AT TWENTY

81

Since Georgia exempted intellectually disabled defendants
from criminal liability, at least twenty-two capital defendants have
raised mental retardation as a defense. 120 Prior to Atkins, one jury
found a female felony murder defendant (a defendant not charged
with intentional murder) mentally retarded, and since Atkins, no
Georgia capital defendant has ever met this burden before a
jury. 121 Because Georgia also mandates jury determination of
Atkins ineligibility, after reading the previous section, one might
wonder whether the choice of decisionmaker rather than the choice
of the burden of proof that has thwarted all Atkins claims. It is
both.
When a jury in any other state determines intellectual
disability, its finding are reviewable on appeal, and it is possible
that appellate review may correct egregious jury errors. 122 But in
Georgia, because of the standard of proof, reversal on appeal would
only occur if the state supreme court reviewing court found that no
reasonable jury could have had a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was intellectually disabled. 123 This is not a matter of
conjecture; the Georgia Supreme Court has never reversed a jury
determination to find Atkins ineligibility. 124 Moreover, that court’s
120. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) (“Although Georgia has ostensibly outlawed the imposition of the
death penalty for mentally retarded offenders for over twenty years, of the
twenty-two reported capital cases involving mental retardation claims, only
one defendant has ever successfully established his mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
121. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, supra note 116, at 584 (reviewing all cases
that went to jury verdict and establishing that the 11th Circuit’s claim in Hill v.
Humphrey, that there were several jury verdicts of guilty but intellectually
disabled, was erroneous).
122. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 313 (N.C. 2009) (reversing a
jury finding that defendant was not intellectually disabled); Commonwealth v.
Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910–24 (Pa. 2021) (reviewing a jury determination where the
standard of proving intellectual disability is preponderance of the evidence).
123. See United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 856 (11th Cir. 2011)). (“We review de novo the
sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, and “we will not disturb a guilty
verdict unless, given the evidence in the record, no trier of fact could have found
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
124. There is only one Atkins win in Georgia, and it occurred in a case where
intellectual disability was not raised at trial, and the post-conviction court found
the defendant intellectually disabled, a finding that the State did not challenge
on appeal, and therefore was not reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court. See
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reasoning in its most recent Atkins case makes plain both that the
burden is an insurmountable barrier even in starkly meritorious
cases and that state court itself will not strike down or ameliorate
that burden. 125
The evidence in Rodney Young’s case that he has intellectual
disability is so direct and so unimpeached that if it did not satisfy
the BARD standard, it is hard to imagine a case where the
evidence would. 126 His evidence is both simpler and more
straightforward than is possible in many cases because Mr. Young
was classified as “educable mentally retarded” as a child. 127 Mr.
Young’s lawyers put on extensive evidence of his qualifying IQ test
scores, of the New Jersey public schools classification of Mr. Young
as intellectually disabled when he was still very young, and of an
academic performance throughout high school that corroborated
that classification. 128 No expert concluded that Mr. Young was not
intellectually disabled. Rather, the only evidence that the state
proffered to rebut the evidence of intellectual disability was the
testimony of two witnesses who had worked with Mr. Young in a
factory applying labels to canned goods, and who reported Mr.
Young was skilled at applying labels. Neither had any experience
teaching or assessing people with intellectual disability. 129
Nonetheless, the jury found Mr. Young had failed to prove his
intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt, a finding that
Hill, 662 F.3d at 1376 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating that only one defendant
has ever successfully established “mental retardation”); see also Hall v. Lewis,
692 S.E.2d 580, 592 (Ga. 2010) (“[T]he habeas court found that Lewis established
that he is mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt” (citing Turpin v. Hill,
498 S.E.2d 52 (1998) (authorizing habeas courts to address belated mental
retardation claims under the “miscarriage of justice” exception) “and the Warden
has not appealed that finding.”).
125. See Young v. State, 860 S.E.2d 746, 776–78 (Ga. 2021) (rejecting the
defendant’s contention that he was intellectually disabled).
126. See id. at 759 (discussing Young’s extensive evidence of intellectual
disability).
127. See id. (elaborating that Young presented evidence in support of findings
of intellectual disability by the jury including testimony from staff members at
his former high school).
128. See id. (“Young . . . had been in special education, had been classified as
“educable mentally retarded” and therefore must have been tested with an IQ of
between 60 and 69, and had struggled intellectually in academics and in sports.”).
129. See id. at 782 (failing to mention any psychological training on the part
of any of the canning employees).
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the Georgia Supreme Court upheld (over several dissents) because
“considering the conflicting testimony on the subject, Young had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was ‘mentally
retarded.’” 130 Thus, lay testimony that a defendant has skills that
no competent professional would deem inconsistent with
intellectual disability is sufficient to create reasonable doubt as to
intellectual disability. 131 Because it would be easy to adduce such
testimony regarding virtually any defendant able to commit a
homicide, it is hard to see what protection Atkins offers to Georgia
defendants.
2. Constitutional Constraints
The Georgia Supreme Court’s Young opinion also upheld the
BARD standard against a constitutional challenge. 132 A detailed
consideration of the constitutional constraints on imposition of a
higher burden of proof may be found in the Young petition for
certiorari and the briefs of amici supporting the petition. 133 For our
purposes, it is enough to summarize why consideration of the
harshness of the BARD standard and its interaction with the
nature of the Atkins determination should make it plain why its
130. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rodney Renia Young, Petitioner, v.
State of Georgia, Respondent., 2021 WL 5513974 (U.S.), 9 (explaining that while
the jury found that he did not have an intellectual disability, jurors continued to
ask questions about intellectual disability in the sentencing phase to use it as
potential mitigation).
131. See id. at 3 (“In every other State in the Union, if a capital defendant
shows by either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence
that he has intellectual disability, he cannot be executed. Yet in Georgia, the same
defendant will be executed.”).
132. See Young v. State, 860 S.E.2d 746, 776 (Ga. 2021) (“[W]e hold that the
standard of proof for intellectual disability claims presently chosen by Georgia’s
General Assembly is not unconstitutional.”).
133. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rodney Renia Young,
Petitioner, v. State of Georgia, Respondent, 2021 WL 5513974 (U.S.); Brief for the
Rutherford Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Young v.
Georgia, 2021 WL 6205944 (2021) (No. 21-782); Brief for Disability Legal Rights
Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Young v. Georgia, 2021 WL
6205945 (2021) (No. 21-782); Brief for Charles Fried and Seth P. Waxman as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Young v. Georgia, 2021 WL 6140210 (2021)
(No. 21-782); Brief for Elsa R. Alcala et al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Young v. Georgia, 2021 WL 6140216 (2021) (No. 21-782).
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use in Atkins determinations is inappropriate. The standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the most demanding known to
Anglo-American jurisprudence, one that developed to protect the
innocent from wrongful conviction and with very few exceptions,
its application has been limited to the government’s obligation to
produce enough evidence to convict an individual charged with an
alleged crime. 134 In that application, the standard reflects the
judgment that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that
one innocent suffer.” 135 Moreover, it is a burden that, at least in
the run of the mill criminal case, can be satisfied, both because of
the nature of the factual inquiry and because the jury is disposed
to find it satisfied. 136
In contrast, the function of the BARD standard in Georgia
Atkins cases is to assure punishment even in the face of strong
evidence that it is constitutionally forbidden. 137 The Young
majority cited no case—because there is no case—upholding the
imposition of the BARD standard on proof of a constitutional
violation. 138 The closest parallel is Cooper v. Oklahoma, 139 in which
the Supreme Court unanimously held that due process precludes
a state from requiring a criminal defendant to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is mentally incompetent to stand trial.
134. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The [reasonable doubt]
standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that
bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’” (citing Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))).
135. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; see Winship, 397 U.S. at
372 (1970) (“[It is] a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
136. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (1970) (“Moreover, use of the
reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.”).
137. See Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1371–72 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he burden Georgia places on a capital offender to prove the
ultimate fact on which his Eighth Amendment right depends allocates almost the
entire risk of error to the offender while leaving virtually none of it with the
State.”).
138. The majority relied upon Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), which
did uphold a BARD standard on the affirmative defense of insanity. The
difference, however, as the dissent in Young v. State, 860 S.E.2d 746 (2021), and
the petition for certiorari point out, is that the insanity defense is not
constitutionally mandated.
139. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
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The reasoning in Cooper is plainly applicable here: The heightened
standard offends a “principle of justice that is deeply rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people,” 140 one that is
fundamentally unfair in operation because the consequences of
error for the defendant were “dire,” 141 and would mean that a
person who was more likely than not incompetent would
nonetheless be forced to stand trial. 142
3. Specific Barriers to Finding Intellectual Disability Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
Moreover, given the nature of scientific and clinical
understanding of intellectual and developmental disability,
Georgia’s requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt cannot
be met in most cases in which competent clinicians would agree
that the defendant is a person with intellectual disability. 143 “All
diagnoses of mental retardation are potentially challenging,” 144
and even in ideal settings, qualified experts ordinarily diagnose
mental retardation only to a reasonable degree of medical (or
professional) certainty. 145 This divergence between the clinical
standard and the BARD standard alone will stymie many Atkins
claims, for it provides the opportunity to argue that the
professional testimony fails to satisfy the standard. Of equal
importance are the ways in which capital cases are far from ideal
settings, and further impede determinations with the level of
140. Id. at 360–62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 364.
142. Id. at 366–67.
143. See Hill, 662 F.3d at 1375 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“Georgia limited this
constitutionally guaranteed right to only those individuals who could establish
mental retardation beyond any reasonable doubt, a standard that cannot be met
when experts are able to formulate even the slightest basis for disagreement.”);
see id. at 1381 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“I am struck by the gross disparity between
the certainty communicated to the factfinder by that type of expert opinion—a
reasonable degree of medical certainty—and that required by Georgia’s Atkins
burden of proof—proof beyond any reasonable doubt.”).
144. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, User’s Guide: Mental Retardation Definitions, Classification and
Systems of Support 14 (10th ed. 2007) [hereinafter AAIDD, 10th ed].
145. See id. (detailing how a diagnosis is provided and the clinical signs and
behaviors that characterize a diagnosis).
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certainty required in Georgia. Capital trials often pose one or more
of four clinically recognized obstacles to the diagnoses of
intellectual disability—co-morbidity, mild mental-retardation,
retrospective
assessment,
and
sub-optimal
assessment conditions—and simultaneously increase the salience
of possible malingering. 146
The first significant barrier to proving intellectual disability
beyond a reasonable doubt is the prevalence of comorbid
psychiatric conditions, “which are much more prevalent among
individuals with intellectual disability than the general
population.” 147 In theory, comorbidity should not influence the
diagnosis of intellectual disability, but given the adversarial
context of Atkins proceedings, comorbidity creates the opportunity
to argue that low IQ scores, which are necessary to meet prong one,
are not accurate measures of intellectual functioning, but are
artificially depressed by mental illness. 148 Extreme mental illness
may preclude the administration of a standard IQ test, and other
mental illnesses, particularly depression, may diminish
performance on an IQ test; 149 any ethical expert would have to
acknowledge the impact that depression tends to have on
performance—and the possibility that a defendant with comorbid
depression and mild intellectual disability would, absent the
depression, score in the borderline range. 150 Although such
questioning is possible even when the burden of proof is less
draconian, satisfying an ordinary burden of proof is possible by
146. See generally Jennifer LaPrade & John L. Worrall, Determining
Intellectual Disability in Death Penalty Cases: A State-by-State Analysis. 3 J.
CRIM. JUST. & L. 1 (2020) (underscoring the lack of consensus by various states
on the definition of intellectual disability).
147. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, User’s Guide: Mental Retardation Definitions, Classification and
Systems of Support 15 (9th ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAIDD, 9th ed.].
148. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (“Not all people who
claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of
mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus.”).
149. See generally Harold A. Sackeim et al., Effects of Major Depression on
Estimates of Intelligence, 14 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 268
(1992).
150. See Grant L. Iverson et al. Predictive Validity of WAIS-R VIQ-PIQ Splits
in Persons with Major Depression. 55 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 519, 519–24 (1999)
(“Persons with psychiatric dis-orders, and depression in particular, may show PIQ
decrements.”).
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considering the consistency of earlier scores or previous academic
records, or the corroborating value of poor adaptive functioning
across the life span. 151 In Georgia, however, such evidence would
still likely not satisfy the burden of proof because a reasonable
doubt may remain as to whether the defendant was depressed at
the earlier point in time.
Similarly, comorbid personality or behavioral disorders may
cast doubt on the proof of significant adaptive functioning deficits
necessary to satisfy prong two; although the concepts of adaptive
functioning deficits and the criteria for behavioral and personality
disorders are distinct, the overlap between behaviors that reflect
adaptive functioning deficits and behaviors that permit an
inference of criteria for other psychiatric disorders, the prosecution
may argue that apparent adaptive functioning deficits are “really”
attributable to conduct and/or personality disorders rather than to
intellectual disability. In Oklahoma, where the burden of proof is
preponderance of the evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected the state’s argument that admitted multiple deficits were
better attributed to antisocial personality disorder, schizophrenia,
and/or drug abuse, finding that “[a]n alternative explanation for
an agreed condition is not a negation of that condition.” 152 But even
an educated, conscientious factfinder might would be thwarted in
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant with a
comorbid psychiatric disorder also has intellectual disability.
A second clinically recognized obstacle to reliable diagnosis in
Atkins cases is the overwhelming predominance of persons with
“mild” intellectual disability. 153 Mild intellectual disability is
151. See Clemons v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 967 F.3d 1231, 1245
(11th Cir. 2020) (giving an example of a state that requires the defendant to prove
that they have been dealing with developmental issues prior to reaching the age
of eighteen).
152. See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 653 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2005)
(noting the Oklahoma court’s recognition that findings of alternative explanations
other than a diagnosis of intellectual disability does not negative the possibility
of an intellectual disability).
153. Almost all of the capital defendants whom Atkins exempts from
imposition of the death penalty are persons in the “mild” range, both because
approximately 75 percent of person with intellectual disability fall into the “mild”
category, and because persons who are more impaired rarely function well enough
to be subject to criminal proceedings. See Atkins, supra note 148 and
accompanying text.
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characterized by an IQ between fifty-five and seventy (or, as tested,
seventy-five, taking into account the standard error of
measurement, as discussed below). 154 But all IQ scores, like all
psychometric measurements, are imprecise and vary to some
degree due to the circumstances of the test administration,
examiner behavior, cooperation of the test taker, and other
personal and environmental factors. 155 The “standard error of
measurement” quantifies this variability and provides a confidence
interval within which the person’s true score falls.” 156 The
standard error of measurement on the commonly used IQ tests is
about five points, which means that for a measured score of sixtysix, for example there is a strong likelihood that the true score
is between sixty-one and seventy-one, a strong likelihood that will
satisfy prong one in a jurisdiction with a preponderance of the
evidence standard. 157 But it can be argued that for a persons with
a measured scores of sixty-six (or even sixty-three), that there is a
still some “reasonable doubt” as to their subaverage intellectual
functioning. 158

154. See Peter J.G. Nouwens et al., Identifying Classes of Persons with Mild
Intellectual Disability or Borderline Intellectual Functioning: A Latent Class
Analysis, 17 BMC PSYCH. 1 (2017) (“Persons with a mild intellectual disability
(MID); intelligence quotient (IQ) range 50–69.”).
155. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, User’s Guide: Intellectual Disability Definitions, Classification and
Systems of Support 36 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD, 11th ed.] (explaining
the variations in scores due to environmental factors).
156. See id. (defining the “standard error of measurement”).
157. See Simon Whitaker, Error in the estimation of intellectual ability in the
low range using the WISC-IV and WAIS-III, UNIV. OF HUDDERSFIELD REPOSITORY
(“[T]here is a margin of error, usually considered to be about five points either
side of the obtained IQ, which should be taken into account when making a
diagnosis of ID [intellectual disability].”) [https://perma.cc/XD9Z-K7P6].
158. More scores—all consistent—increase the clinician’s confidence that the
measurement is accurate and would permit him or her to so testify. But there is
no formula that aggregates probabilities over numerous scores to which a
clinician could testify. Moreover, for some defendants, multiple scores may not be
feasible for reasons including practice effects, the willingness of a court to fund
multiple tests, and the unavailability of more than one reliable test for a person
with the defendant’s language. See AAIDD, 11th ed., supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
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The third obstacle to finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is the difficulty posed by retrospective diagnoses. 159 In
many Atkins cases, either the defendant did not receive an official
diagnosis of intellectual disability as a child, or the records of that
diagnosis unavailable by the time of trial. 160 The factfinder’s
immediate reaction to the absence of a juvenile diagnosis of
intellectual disability may be that the defendant did not have the
disability. In fact, the clinical literature, however, recognizes that
the absence of such a diagnosis may stem from other factors, such
as the person’s lack of a full school experience, parental opposition,
the desire to protect the person from stigma or teasing, avoidance
of claims of racial discrimination, unavailability of programs or
funding, or the lack of entry into the referral process due to
cultural or linguistic reasons. 161 Most dramatically, court orders
have precluded IQ testing or classification in some school districts
based on prior discrimination. 162 Thus, there may be good reasons
for the absence of a diagnosis during the developmental period,
reasons that competent counsel can present, but existence of such
reasons is not likely to dispel a reasonable doubt created by the
absence of an earlier diagnosis.
Moreover, there are no obvious fixes for other difficulties
created by retrospective diagnosis. If a prosecutor asks an expert
the reliability of retrospective diagnosis, he or she would have to
admit that the phenomenon of “[m]emory degradation is [a] real
issue, and [that] there is no solid research regarding the forgetting
curve . . . regarding someone’s recollection of another person’s
adaptive behavior.” 163 Nor is there a fix for the fact that with
retrospective diagnoses, often the only informants who can recall
159. See United States v. Candelario-Santana, 916 F. Supp. 2d 191, 214
(D.P.R. 2013) (“[R]etrospective diagnosis may be necessary to determine whether
a[n] . . . individual suffered from mental retardation before the age of eighteen.”).
160. See id. (presenting an example of defendant who was never given a
diagnosis).
161. See id. at 220 (providing an example of a defendant who dropped out of
school and came from a poor economic background).
162. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967) (“As to the
remedy with respect to the [IQ] track system, the track system simply must be
abolished. In practice, if not in concept, it discriminates against the
disadvantaged child.”).
163. See Marc J. Tasse, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of
Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCH. 114, 119 (2009).
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the defendant’s functioning during the development period are
family members and friends, and such “retrospective reports are
frequently challenged because of the potential biases of the family
member or friend who knows that their accounts will be used in
determining whether the individual will be . . . protected from the
death penalty . . . .” 164 Although there are detailed guidelines for
retrospective diagnosis 165 to which an expert can adhere and
describe, it is unlikely that adherence to those guidelines will
overcome every reasonable doubt argued by a prosecutor to arise
from memory degradation or from reliance on the reports of biased
family members or the lack of a diagnosis during the
developmental period. 166
The fourth condition which the clinical literature identifies as
rendering assessment of mental retardation particularly
challenging is a catchall: “situations that preclude formal
assessment or impair its validity, reliability or utility.” 167 These
include legal restrictions that hinder assessment; incarceration
makes access to the individual himself more difficult, limits time,
often results in distracting testing conditions, and frequently
makes interviews less conducive to self-disclosure, a factor that
may be important in evaluating adaptive functioning. 168
Additionally, the capital charges the defendant faces may make
others reluctant to “help” him by providing evidence of his adaptive
functioning deficits, and it may produces unreliable evidence
designed to ensure his death sentence. Although the clinical
164. See D.J. Reschly, Documenting the Developmental Origins of Mild
Mental Retardation, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCH. 124, 132 (2009). Ironically, those
reports may be biased towards minimizing adaptive functioning deficits rather
than exaggerating them, either because family and friends themselves are
intellectually impaired, or because they are ashamed that they did not seek
services for the defendant when he was a child.
165. See AAIDD, 9th ed., supra note 147, at 18–22 (detailing the guidelines
for diagnosis).
166. See United States v. Candelario-Santana, 916 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.P.R.
2013) (providing an example of a defendant who failed to show that he suffered
from significant behavior limitations).
167. See AAIDD, 9th ed., supra note 147, at 22 (outlining the fourth condition
that makes assessment of intellectual disability challenging).
168. See KiDeuk Kim et al., The Processing and Treatment of Mentally Ill
Persons in the Criminal Justice System, URB. INST. (detailing effects of inadequate
care that prisoners receive in relation to their mental health)
[https://perma.cc/FK4P-3XKH]
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literature warns that “Correctional Officers and other prison
personnel should probably never be sought as respondents to
provide information regarding the adaptive behavior of an
individual that they observed in a prison setting . . . [because t]he
prison setting is an artificial environment that offers limited
opportunities for many activities and behaviors defining adaptive
behavior,” 169 testimony by prison personnel is often permitted, and
may be another source of “reasonable doubt” even when there is no
valid evidence contradicting intellectual disability. 170
The fourth risk of error that threatens Atkins determinations,
and is compounded by a BARD standard, is the necessity for crosscultural competence. 171 One extreme cultural barrier to
assessment lies in cases involving foreign nationals, particularly
those from countries in which English is not the native language;
logistical barriers to collecting records and informants are
exacerbated by cultural barriers to communication, correct
interpretation of information, and overlooking important sources
of misinterpreted information. 172 Beyond that, some “experts” have
dismissed evidence of disability as simply a product of minority
group membership, making upward adjustments of IQ scores
based on minority group membership 173 or testifying that behavior
that would otherwise qualify as demonstrating adaptive
functioning deficits should be disregarded because it is normal for

169. Tasse, supra note 163, at 119.
170. See United States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d 482, 517 (E.D. La. 2011)
(giving an example of how correctional officers’ testimonies were used to
determine whether a Defendant had an intellectual disability).
171. See ELLIS CRAIG & MARC TASSE, CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP
COMPARISONS OF ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, IN ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS
MEASUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIELD OF MENTAL RETARDATION 134 (Robert
Schalock & David Braddock eds., 1999) (“Cross-cultural skills include
understanding of one’s own values, knowledge of the other culture(s), and the
ability to interact and communicate in a sensitive fashion with members of other
cultures.”).
172. See Ai Ohtani et al., Language Barriers and Access to Psychiatric Care:
A Systematic Review, PSYCH. ONLINE (highlighting several studies that address
the linguistic barrier to psychiatric care) [https://perma.cc/YEL3-UUTR]
173. See Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75879, 2010 WL 1817772 (Tex. Ct. Crim.
App. May 5, 2010) (demonstrating experts dismissing evidence of intellectual
disability as a product of minority group status).
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the individuals’ ethnic group. 174 Even when such “expert”
testimony is countered by the testimony of other experts that such
biased evaluation is contrary to professional norms, 175 its
presentation may nonetheless create “reasonable doubt” of either
subaverage intellectual functioning, or significant adaptive
functioning deficits, or both. 176
A final obstacle to a determination of Atkins ineligibility under
a BARD standard is the spectre of malingering, “the intentional
production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological
symptoms motivated by external incentives.” 177 Malingering, even
in the Atkins context, is not common, in part because there are both
instruments that measure malingering and clinically recognized
methods for detecting it, and in part because the social barriers to
feigning intellectual disability are substantial, rendering it more
common to try to conceal intellectual disability than to feign it. 178
Nonetheless, the possibility of malingering will be salient in a
capital case because a jury is likely to perceive the defendant’s
incentive to be found intellectually disabled as enormous. Any
rational factfinder would have to consider that possibility, and
though clinical judgment together with malingering tests may be

174. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Thaler, No. SA-08-CA-805-XR, 2011 WL 4437091,
at *24 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011) (finding that two experts’ belief that
“consideration of a subject’s cultural group was essential to accurately evaluating
the subject’s adaptive functioning . . . was objectively reasonable and fully
consistent with the evidence before that state court”).
175. See AAIDD, 10th ed., supra note 144, at 23 (“Do not allow cultural or
linguistic diversity to overshadow or minimize actual disability.”).
176. See, e.g., Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091, at *24 (affirming appellate
court’s rejection of defendant-petitioner’s Atkins claim upholding appellate court’s
conclusion
that
“petitioner
failed
to
establish
through
credible
evidence . . . significant limitations in adaptive functioning”).
177. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 739 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “malingering”).
178. See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 430–31 (1985) (explaining that because
of the powerful stigma attached to mental illness or developmental disabilities,
affected individuals and their families will go to great lengths to hide those
disabilities); Sean D. O’Brien, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 739 (2008) (“Because of
the powerful stigma attached to mental illness or developmental disabilities,
afflicted individuals and their families will take extreme measures to hide those
disabilities.”); see generally ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE:
STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED (Univ. of California Press 1967).
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informative and even quite persuasive, in many cases, a
reasonable doubt as to malingering could persist. 179
4. BARD, Atkins, and the Supreme Court
Thus, the absence of any Supreme Court case upholding the
imposition of the BARD standard on proof of a constitutional
violation, the particular barriers to proving intellectual disability
beyond a reasonable doubt, the empirical evidence that the BARD
standard is impossible to satisfy in Atkins decisions, and the
unmixed evidence in Rodney Young’s case all weighed in favor of a
grant of certiorari. Young also met an established criterion for
certiorari: conflict with other state court decisions. Indeed, five
state supreme courts have concluded that the BARD standard
cannot be imposed upon Atkins claimants; two have invalidated
statutes requiring clear and convincing evidence for Atkins claims
under the Due Process Clause, and three, in the absence of a state
statute, held that only the preponderance standard satisfies the
Due Process Clause. 180 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 181 as it repeatedly did with respect to other states’

179. Mandi W. Musso et al., Development and Validation of the Stanford
Binet-5 Rarely Missed Items-Nonverbal Index for the Detection of Malingered
Mental Retardation, 26 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCH. 756, 758–59 (2011)
(“[T]he limited empirical research available indicates that current tests of
neurocognitive and psychiatric feigning designed to detect malingering do not
adequately assess feigned MR.”). Thus, an ethical clinician cannot testify to
certainty that the defendant’s effort on an I.Q. test was optimal based upon a
malingering instrument, but must rely in part on clinical judgment, judgement
that a prosecutor can argue is mistaken. See id.
180. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–16, Young v. Georgia, 142 S.
Ct. 1206 (2022) (No. 21-782) (demonstrating the standard used by all other lower
courts is lower than that is articulated in Young). Additionally, several amici have
filed briefs in support of the petition. See generally Brief for Charles Fried & Seth
P. Waxman as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Young, 142 S. Ct. 1206 (No.
21-782); Brief for Elsa R. Alcala et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Young, 142 S. Ct. 1206 (No. 21-782); Brief for Disability Rights Legal Center et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Young, 142 S. Ct. 1206 (No. 21-782);
Brief for Rutherford Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Young, 142 S. Ct. 1206 (No. 21-782).
181. See Young v. Georgia, 142 S.Ct. 1206 (Mem.) (2022) (denying cert).
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substantive deviations from clinical definitions of intellectual
disability (and as we further discuss in Part II). 182
Moreover, Young’s petition was not the first to ask the Court
to address the permissibility of Georgia’s burden of proof; Warren
Hill’s was. 183 In that petition, the prior litigation posed the issue
with extraordinary clarity. 184 Because Hill’s trial lawyer did not
raise the intellectual disability issue, the Georgia Supreme Court
remanded the issue to a state habeas court to determine it. The
lower state court found that though Hill met the BARD standard
with respect to the first prong, intellectual functioning, he did not
meet it with respect to the second, adaptive functioning. 185 When
Atkins was decided shortly thereafter, Hill moved for
reconsideration. 186 The state habeas court then ruled that that
Atkins compelled the rejection of the statutory standard in favor of
a preponderance of the evidence standard, and that Hill met the
criteria for intellectual disability under that standard. 187 Then
Georgia Supreme Court rejected the habeas court’s premise,
affirming both its pre-Atkins holding that the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard applied to all defendants tried after passage of the
statute and Hill’s death sentence. It did not, however, dispute the
lower court’s view that the burden of proof was dispositive. 188
Hill initially prevailed on his claim that Georgia’s beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof violated Atkins before a divided
182. See supra Part II (analyzing how states deviate from clinical definitions
of intellectual disability).
183. See Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52, 53–54 [hereinafter Hill I] (arguing in
a post-conviction appeal that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
defendant’s alleged mental retardation claim at trial).
184. See Sudeall, supra note 116, at 562–63 (providing a more detailed
description of the Hill litigation).
185. See Order at 4–6, Hill v. Head, No. 94-V-216 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 13,
2002) (demonstrating a court’s finding that the second prong of BARD was not
met).
186. See Sudeall, supra note 116, at 562–63 (noting petitioner moved for
reconsideration).
187. See Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Habeas
Corpus Relief at 9, Hill v. Head, No. 94-V-216 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2002)
(noting petitioner met criteria for intellectual disability under a preponderance of
the evidence standard).
188. See Hill v. Head, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620–21 (Ga. 2003) [hereinafter Hill II]
(noting the Georgia Supreme Court’s recognition of the importance of the burden
of proof).

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA AT TWENTY

95

panel of the Eleventh Circuit, which reasoned that the standard
“necessarily will result in the deaths of mentally retarded
individuals.” 189 However, the en banc Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the Georgia court’s holding was not
“contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the controlling
Supreme Court precedent.” 190 We discuss AEDPA’s role in
diminishing Atkins’ protection in Part IV, 191 but whether because
of AEPDA or the merits of Hills’s claim, or both. the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 192 Then, before Georgia could execute Hill,
one of state’s psychiatrist retracted his opinion that Hill was not
intellectually disabled, which led the other two state experts to
reconsider their prior opinion, and to agree that Hill was in fact
intellectually disabled. 193 After successive petitions in state and
federal court, and despite attempts a clemency campaign that
included statements from former President Jimmy Carter, the
American Bar Association, and mental health advocacy groups, the
Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole denied clemency, and
Georgia executed Warren Hill. 194 Given the denial of certiorari in
Young, more such executions should be expected.
C. Rejecting the Ford Analogy
The Supreme Court was wrong to apply Ford’s indifference to
implementing procedure to Atkins. The Court’s selection of Ford as
the hands-off model for Atkins was a mistake from the outset
because of differences between the two kinds of claims, as
189. See Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter
Hill III] (quoting trial court order), rev’d en banc, Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Hill IV] (noting the Eleventh Circuit’s recognition
that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard violated Atkins).
190. See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1360 (reversing the Eleventh Circuit opinion en
banc due to the AEDPA).
191. See infra Part IV (analyzing the role of the AEDPA in diminishing
protections of intellectually disabled offenders under Atkins).
192. See Hill v. Humphrey, 566 U.S. 1041 (2012) [hereinafter Hill V]
(announcing the denial of certiorari).
193. See Sudeall, supra note 116, at 564–65 (recounting the events that led to
a diagnosis of intellectual disability for Hill).
194. See id. at 654–65 (addressing the execution of Warren Hill).
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discussed above, but its continued disengagement is even less
defensible, given some of the procedures states have selected and
how those procedures have doomed meritorious Atkins claims. The
appropriate correction, we think, is to reject viewing the question
of regulating procedure as a binary one. Rather, the Court should
have taken the approach it did in Batson v. Kentucky, 195 mandating
some aspects of the procedures while leaving others to the states;
doing some would have precluded the states from “implementing”
Atkins through procedures that effectively nullify it. 196
IV. Substantive Deviations from the Diagnostic Criteria for
Intellectual Disability
A. IQ Cut-Offs
In Cherry v. State, 197 the Florida Supreme Court, relying on
language in Atkins permitting states to come up with “appropriate
ways” to enforce the categorical exclusion, held that an IQ score
above seventy, even one that fell within the seventy-one to seventyfive standard error of measurement (“SEM”) present in all tests of
intelligence, precluded a claim of intellectual disability. 198 The
court read the post-Atkins Florida statute, which defined
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as an IQ of “70 or

195. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (reversing conviction of
a Black defendant after the trial court “flatly rejected” the defendant’s timely
objection to the prosecutor’s removal of all Black jurors from the venire without
explanation, and remanding case to determine whether the facts support a prima
facie showing of purposeful race discrimination).
196. See id. at 89 (explaining that prosecutors are generally entitled to
exercise peremptory challenges to potential jurors at will, but prosecutors are
forbidden from excluding potential jurors on account of their race or the
assumption that Black jurors will categorically be unable to impartially consider
the State’s case against a Black defendant).
197. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 714 (Fla. 2007) (affirming circuit
court’s determination that “Cherry’s IQ score of 72 does not fall within the
statutory range for mental retardation” and thereby precluding a defense of
intellectual disability).
198. See id. at 713–14 (demonstrating the court’s standard as to what is
considered a diagnosis of intellectual disability based on IQ score).
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below” as establishing a strict cutoff. 199 Thus, because Roger
Cherry had proffered an IQ score of seventy-two at his state court
intellectual disability hearing, his claim failed as a matter of
law. 200 The Florida Supreme Court justified this as a matter of
interpreting the “plain language” of the statute. 201 Although this
reading of the statute was inconsistent with both of the definitions
of intellectual disability the Supreme Court referenced in Atkins
because they accounted for the SEM by noting an IQ of
“approximately 70,” 202 the state court did not deem those
definitions binding because Atkins “left to the states the task of
setting specific rules in their “determination statutes.” 203 Florida
courts rejected several other claims of intellectual disability on this
same basis. 204 Alabama, Kentucky, Idaho, and Tennessee adopted
similarly strict IQ cutoffs of seventy. 205 Ohio took the slightly more
moderate position that a score above seventy created rebuttable
presumptions that an Atkins claimant did not have intellectual
disability. 206 Challenges to this type of deviation from clinical
consensus were rejected for more than a decade while the Supreme
Court of the United States repeatedly chose not to intervene.

199. See id. (providing more details on the standard as to who can be defined
as intellectually disabled).
200. See id. at 714 (recounting why Cherry’s claim of intellectual disability
failed).
201. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007) (explaining the
reasoning of the Florida court for its ruling).
202. See id. at 713 (noting the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of IQ as a
factor in determining intellectual disability and how they wanted states to
analyze it); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308, n.3 (2002)
(demonstrating the nuance used by the Florida court to meet the Atkins
standard).
203. See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 713 (showing the tactics that the Florida courts
used to avoid strict Atkins interpretation).
204. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 329 (Fla. 2007); Zack v. State,
911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005) (demonstrating the Florida courts history of
rejecting claims along these lines).
205. See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 144 So. 3d 457 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012)
(demonstrating that this standard is not limited to Florida but has been used in
a number of states); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005)
(same); Pizzuto v. State, 484 P.3d 823 (Idaho 2021) (same); Howell v. State, 151
S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2004) (same).
206. See State v. Elmore, No. 2005-CA-32, 2005 WL 2981797, at *8 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 3, 2005) (explaining the different approach adopted by Ohio courts).
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Thus, when Freddie Lee Hall, a Florida death row inmate for
more than thirty years, sought the benefit of Atkins, his claim was
rejected by the Florida Supreme Court solely because he had
previously scored above seventy on an IQ test. 207 As they had done
in other cases, the state courts applied this bright line rule despite
strong evidence Hall met all three prongs necessary for an
intellectual disability diagnosis: significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning, and onset
before age eighteen. 208 After denying certiorari to consider whether
Florida’s rule was consistent with Atkins in several other cases,
including Cherry, the Court decided to review Hall’s case. 209
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-to-three majority, concluded
that Florida’s rigid rule refusing to acknowledge the SEM inherent
in any IQ test “disregards established medical practice” both
because it “takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a
defendant’s intellectual capacity” and also because it “relies on a
purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his
IQ scores, while failing to recognize that score is, on its own terms,
imprecise.” 210 His opinion further states that “Florida’s rule
misconstrues the Court’s statement in Atkins that intellectual
disability is characterized by an I.Q. of approximately 70.” 211 The
decision in Hall—a no-brainer as a matter of clinical practice —
was significant because the Court at several points referred to the
“views of the medical community,” “established medical practice,”
the “professional community,” “medical experts,” and the “medical
community’s diagnostic framework.” 212 The Court’s holding that
Florida’s refusal to take the SEM into account was inconsistent
with those views, practices and opinions signaled that states are
not free to define intellectual disability in a manner at odds with
207. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014) (explaining the reasoning
behind rejecting Hall’s appeal).
208. See id. at 710 (elaborating on the criteria used to show mental disability).
209. See id. (showing that cases granted certiorari to review the Florida rule’s
consistency with the Atkins rule).
210. See id. at 712–13 (providing Justice Kennedy’s opinion on the flaws of
Florida’s system).
211. See id. at 724 (providing Justice Kennedy’s assessment on Florida’s
interpretation of Atkins).
212. See id. at 707, 710, 712, 714 (demonstrating the inconsistency within the
Hall opinion from the Florida court).
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clinical consensus. 213 To rule otherwise, Justice Kennedy wrote,
would allow states to “deny the basic dignity the Constitution
protects.” 214 The bottom line was that the Court agreed “with the
medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within
the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the
defendant must be able to present additional evidence of
intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive
deficits.” 215
While the decision was a win for Hall, resistance by the
Florida courts cabined its potential to correct other Atkins claims
that were wrongly adjudicated prior to Hall. 216 Initially, the
Florida Supreme Court held that Hall v. Florida was retroactive
and that claimants who were out of court would be granted another
opportunity to bring Atkins claims previously rejected because of
an IQ score above seventy. 217 Some defendants 218 managed to do so
before the Florida Supreme Court changed course and overturned
the decision that permitted retroactive application of Hall. 219 The
Court justified its retraction of retroactivity as necessary to protect
the State’s “reliance on Cherry,” and to eliminate the “ongoing
threat of major disruption to application of the death penalty” that
would occur if Hall applied retroactively. 220 Some death row
inmates who initially were permitted to bring an Atkins-plus-Hall
claim ultimately had the claim barred when the Florida Supreme

213. See id. at 723 (explaining the implications of the Hall decision).
214. See id. at 724 (providing Kennedy’s reasoning on the implications if
ruling in the alternative).
215. See id. at 723 (summarizing the opinion and noting what more a
defendant must show in order to prove intellectual disability).
216. See id. (explaining judicial resistance to re-adjudicating cases following
the Hall decision).
217. See Walls v. Florida, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 2016) (outlining the
circumstances under which a case could be tried retroactively).
218. See, e.g., Haliburton v. Florida, No. SC19-1858, 2021 WL 2460806 (Fla.
2021); Foster v. State, 260 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 2018) (elaborating that the ability to
trigger retroactivity was not afforded to all potential inmates).
219. See Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 2020) (clarifying that
some were able to trigger retroactivity before the Florida courts reversed their
stance).
220. See id. at 1021 (explaining the reasoning of the Florida courts for
reversing the retroactivity of Hall).
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Court reversed Hall’s retroactive status 221 while others who were
originally barred by the IQ cut-off and therefore filed no Atkins
claim now are barred by the statute of limitations. 222
B. Distorted Definitions of Adaptive Functioning Deficits
Another notable deviation from clinical consensus occurred,
not surprisingly, in the capitol of capital punishment, Texas.
Although the general definition of intellectual disability found in
the Texas Health and Safety Code was in line with the clinical
consensus, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) did not
apply that definition to Atkins cases. 223 Instead, in Ex Parte
Briseno, it created out of whole cloth a bizarre (at least from a
clinical standpoint) gloss on the adaptive functioning deficits
required by intellectual disability’s second prong. 224 The court’s
disdain for the new categorical bar was clear for it began by noting
that—in its view—it was required to determine what “level and
degree of mental retardation at which a consensus of Texas
citizens would agree that a person should be exempted from the
death penalty.” 225 It then questioned whether every capital
defendant in Texas who met the clinical definition of intellectual
disability should be spared from the executioner. 226 To make what
it described as the “exceedingly subjective” judgment about
adaptive functioning, the state court directed fact-finders to focus

221. See Nixon v. State, 327 So. 3d 780, 783 (Fla. 2021) (demonstrating the
implications for some prisoners who were unable to see through their Hall
retroactivity).
222. See Freeman v. Florida, 300 So. 3d 591, 594 (Fla. 2020) (showing how the
case impacted statute of limitations claims).
223. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (elaborating on inconsistency
in application within Texas).
224. See Ex parte Briseño, 135 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (explaining
the method taken by Texas courts).
225. See id. at 6 (describing the standard the courts aimed to ascertain).
Indeed, the court suggested that Lennie from Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men was a
figure that “[m]ost Texas citizens might agree” lived with intellectual disability.
226. See id. (revealing some of the rhetorical questions presented by the Texas
court).
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on a list of “other evidentiary factors” that were, in the court’s
estimation, “indicative of mental retardation,” 227 including:
• Did those who knew the person best during the
developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers,
employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at
that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination?
• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through
or is his conduct impulsive?
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is
led around by others?
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and
appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral
or written questions or do his responses wander from
subject to subject?
• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or
others’ interests?
• Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness
surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that
offense require forethought, planning, and complex
execution of purpose? 228
Even a casual review of these factors, known as the Briseño 229
factors for the case in which the TCCA announced them, reveals
both that they were steeped in stereotype and that they had no
grounding in the clinical definition of intellectual disability. 230 For
example, the first Briseño factor asks whether those who knew the
person “best” thought he was “mentally retarded.” 231 This assumes
that persons with intellectual disability look and act in a way that
laypeople can easily recognize, an assumption not borne out by the
clinical literature. 232 Other Briseño factors assume that persons
227. See id. at 8 (explaining the instructions from the court).
228. See id. at 8–9 (enumerating the questions compiled by the Texas courts).
229. See id. (elaborating on the broad term for the factors the Texas court uses
while showing the flaws with these factors).
230. See id. (explaining the flaws within the questions formulated by the
Texas courts).
231. Id. at 8.
232. Blume et al., supra note 4, at 707–14.
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with intellectual disability are “impulsive” and “wander” in
conversation from topic to topic, cannot lie and cannot make plans,
generalizations not at all supported by the clinical literature. 233
Rather, that literature establishes that the overwhelming majority
of persons with an intellectual disability “can . . . acquire the
vocational and social skills necessary for independent living.” 234
Relying upon these factors, the Texas courts rejected many very
strong claims of intellectual disability, including some where not a
single expert challenged the defense expert’s diagnosis, 235 yet the
Supreme Court refused to hear numerous challenges to the
legitimacy of the Briseño factors, including many where the factors
were outcome-determinative. 236
The Court finally got around to cleaning up the Briseño mess
in Moore v. Texas, 237 a case that is a cameo of the TCCA’s
recalcitrance. 238 In state habeas, the trial court found that Moore
had intellectual disability. Even though on appeal to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, the county prosecutor agreed with
Moore and trial court that Moore should be removed from death

233. See id. (explaining that the Briseño factors are not based on scientific
literature).
234. See id. (explaining that persons with intellectual disability “can drive,
hold jobs, make money, and operate heavy machinery”).
235. See, e.g., Petetan v. State, No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 915530, at *76 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017) (upholding a finding of no intellectual disability even
though “[n]o psychological expert testified definitively . . . that appellant was not
mentally retarded” and three psychological experts diagnosed that appellant
was); Lizcano v. Texas, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *35 (Tex. Crim. App.
May 5, 2010) (noting, in relation to a jury’s finding that the defendant had no
intellectual disability, the State did not introduce its own expert witness, but
citing Ex parte Briseño to reject the contention that the “State had a burden . . . to
introduce expert witnesses” to disprove intellectual disability); cf. id. at *101
(Price, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is not for the jury to decide “what the Eighth
Amendment standard for determining mental retardation is in the first place”).
236. See, e.g., Lizcano, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, *at 32 (denying
petition for writ of certiorari); Hernandez v. Stephens, 572 U.S. 1036 (2014)
(denying petition for writ of certiorari on the state court decision that the
incarcerated person did not have an intellectually disability).
237. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1060–62 (2017) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing Briseño factors in CCA’s approach as incompatible with
Eighth Amendment).
238. See id. at 1060–61 (relating Hall’s lack of guidance to CCA’s approach).
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row, 239 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, using the
Briseno factors as justification for rejecting the agreement. 240 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the entire Court agreed
that, “by design and in operation,” the Briseño factors created a
constitutionally intolerable risk that persons with intellectual
disability would be wrongfully executed. 241 The majority noted that
the adoption of these evidentiary factors was an outlier both
because only one other state had adopted them and because even
in Texas they were used only death penalty cases. 242 More
specifically, the majority disapproved of how the TCCA focused on
Moore’s strengths to discount his weaknesses, used his weaknesses
to discount IQ scores, and pointed to comorbidities to explain away
clear evidence of intellectual disability. 243 Thus Moore reaffirmed
Hall’s holding that Atkins adjudications must be informed by
medical diagnostics to alleviate the risk that a person with
intellectual disabilities will be executed, 244 this time applying that
principle to the second prong.
However, on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Moore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again found that
Moore’s claim failed. 245 Although it refrained from using the
phrase Briseño factors, its analysis repeated Briseño’s deviations
from clinical standards. 246 Moore appealed to the Supreme Court,
asking for summary reversal with no opposition from the
239. See Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 555, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Alcala,
J., dissenting) (describing applicant meeting burden of intellectual disability
under established medical standards).
240. See Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (noting
role of court as ultimate factfinder after habeas court failed to resolve Briseno
test).
241. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that
even the justices in dissent agreed that the Briseño factors ran afoul of the Eighth
Amendment).
242. See id. at 1052 (describing use of medical standards in Texas for juveniles
and absence in other contexts).
243. See id. at 1049–51 (explaining TCCA’s departure through case history
and prevailing medical standards).
244. See id. at 1048, 1051 (emphasizing the importance of medical standards
for determining intellectual disability with regard to execution).
245. See Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (finding
that Moore failed to demonstrate intellectual disability).
246. See Moore v. Texas 139 S. Ct. 666, 670–72 (2019) [hereinafter Moore II]
(noting same considerations from appeals court in discussion of Moore’s capacity).
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respondent, the county prosecutor. When the Texas Solicitor
General moved to intervene to defend the TCCA’s decision, the
Supreme Court denied the motion, and summarily reversed the
Texas court’s decision 247 Noting that the TCCA’s opinion on
remand “rests upon analysis too much of which too closely
resembles what we previously found improper,” 248 the Court
agreed with Moore, the trial court, and the prosecutor that Moore
had shown he is a person with intellectual disability. On the second
remand, the TCCA finally gave up, grudgingly stating: “There is
nothing left for us to do but to implement the Supreme Court’s
holding.” 249 The TCCA then modified Moore’s sentence to life
imprisonment. 250 Rather remarkably, less than a year later, the
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles granted Moore parole. 251
Moore II ended matters well for Moore himself, and it seems
to have at least somewhat diminished TCCA resistance to Atkins.
In the time between Moore I and the start of 2022, the Court of
Criminal Appeals granted at least seven people Atkins relief 252 and
in at least eleven other cases, the petitioner’s Atkins claim was
reheard, but he has since lost or not yet received a final decision. 253
247. Id. at 672.
248. Id.
249. Ex parte Moore, 587 S.W.3d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
250. See id. (explaining that the TCCA lessened Moore’s sentence).
251. See Jolie McCullough, Bobby Moore’s Supreme Court Case Changed How
Texas Defines Intellectual Disabilities. After 40 Years in Prison, He’s Just Been
Granted Parole, TEXAS TRIBUNE Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.(June
8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NFE9-CMVH] (explaining that Moore was granted
parole less than a year after his sentence reduction).
252. See Ex parte Moore, 587 S.W.3d at 788–89 (granting Atkins relief); Ex
parte Guevara, NO. WR-63,926-03, 2020 WL 5649445 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 23,
2020) (granting Atkins relief); Ex parte Gutierrez, NO. WR-70,152-032020, WL
6930823 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2020) (granting Atkins relief); Ex parte
Lizcano, NO. WR-68,348-03, 2020 WL 5540165 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2020)
(granting Atkins relief); Ex parte Williams, NO. WR-71,296-03, 2020 WL 7234532
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2020) (granting Atkins relief); Ex parte Henderson, NO.
WR-37,658-03, 2020 WL 1870477 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (granting
Atkins relief); Ex parte Sosa, NO. AP–76,674, 2017 WL 2131776 (Tex. Crim. App.
May 3, 2017) (granting Atkins relief).
253. Ex parte Milam, NO. WR-79,322-02, 2020 WL 3635921 (Tex. Crim. App.
July 1, 2020); Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Ex parte
Davis, NO. WR-40,339-09, 2020 WL 1557291 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020); Ex
parte Cathey, WR-55,161-02, 2021 WL 1653233 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2021);
Ex parte Jean, NO. WR–84,327–01, 2017 WL 2859012 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28,
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This of course does nothing to ameliorate the wrong done to Atkins
claimants executed before Moore II; between the Supreme Court
decisions in Atkins and Moore II, Texas executed more than three
hundred people, 254 at least thirteen of whom lost Atkins claims
under the standard held to be unconstitutional in Moore. 255 And
among those eleven cases that went back to court after Moore I, in
one of them, the trial court held a hearing, found that the habeas
petitioner lived with intellectual disability, and the TCCA—as the
“ultimate factfinder”—nevertheless reversed and found that he did
not. 256 In another case, the TCCA used the same record that was
made under Briseno to find that the client was not entitled to relief
after Moore. 257 It remains to be seen how well the other cases will
fare once in front of the TCCA again.
C. Inadequate Federal Habeas Corpus Review
Some readers are likely thinking: “Ok, some state courts have
been bad on Atkins, but can’t a death sentenced inmate file a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court and have the
federal courts resolve the claim?” Sadly, the answer is for the most
part no.
2017); Ex parte Bridgers, NO. WR-45,179-05, 2021 WL 2346539 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 9, 2021); Ex parte Lewis, NO. WR- 86,572-01, 2020 WL 5540550 (Tex. Crim.
App. Sept. 16, 2020); Ex parte Escobedo, NO. WR-86,572-01, 2020 WL 3469044
(Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2020); Ex parte Butler, NO. WR-41,121-03, 2019 WL
4464270 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019); Ex parte Segundo, NO. WR-70,963-02,
2018 WL 4856580 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct 5, 2018); Ex parte Long, NO. WR-76,32402, 2018 WL 3217506 (Tex. Crim. App. June 27, 2018).
254. See
Execution
Database,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.
[https://perma.cc/KL8W-EPLF].
255. Joseph Margulies, John Blume, & Sheri Johnson, Dead Right: A Capital
Punishment Cautionary Tale, 53.1 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 59, 72 (2021).
256. See Ex parte Storey, 584 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (stating
that in habeas, the TCCA views the trial court as the “original factfinder” and
itself—despite being an appellate court—as the “ultimate factfinder.”); see, e.g.,
id. (stating authority to enter contrary findings); see also Ex parte Barnaby, 475
S.W.3d 316, 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (reconsidering habeas court findings
of fact); Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(describing remand to trial court to ascertain truth of facts).
257. See Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 679–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(concluding that no further record development or fact findings are needed and
applicant is not entitled to relief).
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1. Giving Undue Deference

The reality is that strong, sometimes objectively unassailable
claims of intellectual disability rejected by hostile state courts
often fare no better when reviewed by the federal courts in habeas
corpus proceedings. The most common culprit on federal review is
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which is part of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 or “AEDPA.” 258 As a predicate
to federal habeas relief, § 2254(d) requires a petitioner to show not
only that the underlying claim has constitutional merit but also
that the state court decision rejecting the assertion of intellectual
disability was either “contrary to or an unreasonable application
of clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court of
the States,” or was “an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings.” 259 So,
in this context, a habeas petitioner must show that his Atkins
claim is meritorious and show that the state court decision
rejecting his claim was objectively unreasonable. 260
Making matters worse, the Supreme Court of the United
States has interpreted § 2254(d) as imposing a nearly
insurmountable bar. Federal courts must let a state court ruling
stand so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” 261 The Court has made it
clear that this standard is highly deferential to state courts: “If this
standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be . .
. It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s
decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” 262 It goes no
further. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a
“‘guard against extreme malfunction in the state criminal justice
systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through

258. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132 (1996).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2) (2018).
260. See id. (explaining the burden of what the habeas petitioner must show).
261. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)) (explaining the standard of review).
262. See id. at 102 (explaining the difficultly in meeting this standard of
review).
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appeal . . . .” 263 Indeed, some courts have gone decades without a
single habeas grant. 264
The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have used
this crimped view of habeas to let erroneous state court rulings
rejecting Atkins claims stand. 265 Several examples will suffice to
make the point. Reeves v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of
Corrections, 266 a decision rendered by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, provides one illustration. The
Alabama Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves’s claim failed on
prong one—despite measured IQ scores of sixty-eight, seventy-one,
and seventy-three—because the judge hearing the claim, after
observing Reeves in court, concluded that his intellectual
functioning was not significantly subaverage. 267 As for prong two,
the Court of Appeals again rejected objective test scores finding
deficits in adaptive functioning on the basis that his alleged

263. See id. (explaining that the statute intentionally sets a very high burden
of proof to receive relief via a habeas petition).
264. See John Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost) No One Here Gets out
Alive: The Fourth Circuit’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 3
(2010); David R. Dow & Jeffrey R. Newberry, Reversal Rates in Capital Cases in
Texas, 2000–2020, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 3 (2020) (explaining that due to the
stringent burden, courts rarely grant such motions).
265. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 524 (2012) (“Under 2254(d)
[habeas relief is precluded if] it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that
[the state court’s] arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a
prior decision of this Court.” (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102
(2011)); Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726 (2017) (“[On Habeas] even clear error
will not suffice . . . In other words, a litigant must ‘show that the state court’s
ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.”); Mays v. Hines, 141 S.Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021) (“The term
‘unreasonable’ refers not to ‘ordinary error’ or even to circumstances where the
petitioner offers ‘a strong case for relief,’ but rather to ‘extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice syste[m].’” (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
102 (2011)); Larry Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
381, 398 (1996) (explaining that when then Senator Biden pressed Senators
Specter and Hatch on § 2254(d), they made clear in no uncertain terms that the
statute did not require federal courts to defer to state court decisions that were
not unreasonable, calling the assertion “absolutely false”).
266. Reeves v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr. 836 Fed. App’x 733 (11th Cir.
2020).
267. See id. at 740 (stating that defendant’s intellectual functioning was not
significantly subaverage based on all evidence and observation).
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adaptive strengths outweighed his deficits. 268 Though the United
States Supreme Court would eventually reject both practices in
Hall v. Florida 269 and Moore v. Texas, 270 the Eleventh Circuit,
which acknowledged that it was inclined to agree with Reeves on
prong one, determined that the claim failed on prong two because
Moore was decided after the state court ruling and therefore not
“clearly established” for AEDPA purposes. 271 The court also
concluded that while there was evidence of significant deficits in
adaptive functioning, the state court decision finding strengths,
which relied on behavior in prison and other supposed evidence of
strengths, i.e., he sold drugs, was not unreasonable. 272 The Court
said, “we are not sitting as initial triers of fact or determining
whether [Reeves] is in fact [intellectually disabled] . . . We are
reviewing the state habeas court through the prism of AEDPA,”
and thus concluded that Reeves claim could not meet its heavy
standard. 273
2. “Rubber Stamping” State Drafted Orders
What makes decisions like this more galling, and more tragic
for the persons with intellectual disability that will likely
ultimately be executed despite the Eighth Amendment categorical
268. See id. (describing that other evidence was presented that called into
question the validity of the scores).
269. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 724 (2014) (finding exploration of
capital defendant’s intellectual disability unconstitutional).
270. See Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019) (holding that the
petitioner showed that he had intellectual disabilities where the opinion of the
appeals court rests upon analysis too much of which too closely resembles what
was previously found improper).
271. See Reeves, 836 Fed. App’x at 741-42 (explaining that in other cases, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that Hall was not clearly established federal law for
habeas purposes, and thus it was not unreasonable for the state court to reject a
claim using Florida’s 70 IQ cut off); see, e.g., Kilgore v. Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, 805 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that
Hall also was not clearly established federal law for habeas purposes, and thus it
was not unreasonable for the state court to reject a claim using Florida’s strict 70
IQ cut off).
272. See id. at 743 (finding that although Reeves had some intellectual
disabilities, he was still able to care for himself).
273. Id.
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bar, is that many of the state court decisions to which federal
courts give such heavy deference were written by counsel for the
state. 274 In Alabama, for example, attorneys from the capital
division of the State Attorney General’s office represent the State
at post-conviction hearing where most Atkins claims are raised. 275
At the conclusion of the hearing, the State typically presents a
“draft” proposed order rejecting the claim for the state postconviction judge’s consideration. 276 These orders often contain
highly slanted, and in some cases patently false, 277 “findings of
fact,” and, in numerous cases, judges sign these orders verbatim
often without even reading them. 278 Similarly, one study found
that Harris County judges, responsible for more executions than
all states besides Texas, adopted the prosecution’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law verbatim ninety-five percent of the time. 279
Thus the deference given is often not even to a supposedly neutral
finder of fact, but to an advocate for the State.
Several other cases with strong claims that failed under
AEDPA are worth noting. John Matamoros challenged his Texas
death sentence on the basis that he was a person with intellectual
disability. 280 At his initial state court habeas Atkins hearing, the
State’s expert, who testified that Matamoros was not a person with
intellectual disability was Dr. George Denkowski. 281 After the
274. See Jordan M. Steiker, James W. Marcus, & Thea J. Posel, The Problem
of Rubber Stamping in State Capital Habeas Proceedings: A Harris County Case
Study, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 889, 900 (2018) (“Harris County post-conviction
prosecutors have authored and proposed 21,275 separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the Harris County courts have adopted 20,261 of the
prosecutors’ proposed findings verbatim: an adoption rate of 95%.”).
275. ALA. ATT’Y GEN. OFF.: DIV. [https://perma.cc/P3QW-QL95].
276. See Steiker et al., supra note 274, at 898–99 (“Trial courts routinely sign
the prosecution’s proposed orders in their entirety, notwithstanding the presence
of significant factual disagreements.”).
277. See Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d 1119, 1125 (Ala. 2010) (reversing the
denial of the Court of Criminal Appeals where the State lied in their statements
to the court).
278. See Clemons v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 967 F.3d 1231, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2020) (rejecting intellectual disability despite having test scores which
demonstrated him having a mental disability).
279. Steiker, supra note 274, at 900.
280. See generally Matamoros v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2015).
281. See John Floyd & Billy Sinclair, “Junk Science” Once Again Puts Texas
in National Forefront, JOHN T. FLOYD L. FIRM (Jan. 5, 2012) (explaining that
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initial hearing, and rejection of Matamoros’ claim, Denkowski was
officially reprimanded by the Texas State Board of Examiners of
Psychologists due to his highly questionable and unscientific
diagnostic practices which included randomly, and with absolutely
no scientific basis, adding points to the IQ scores of Black and
Hispanic death row inmates. As part of his settlement with the
Board, Denkowski agreed not to engage in any forensic work.
Matamoros’ case was pending in federal court at the time, and the
federal courts stayed the federal proceeding and allowed him to
bring these developments to the state court’s attention. 282 Rather
than grant a new hearing, or consider additional evidence, the
state court signed verbatim an order prepared by the Attorney
General’s office, one that purported to completely disregard
Denkowski’s testimony, but which denied relief and in all other
respects was just like the original order. 283 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed with two judges dissenting. 284 This was
particularly disingenuous given that Denkowski was the only
expert to testify for the State or render an opinion that Matamoros
was not a person with intellectual disability (and given a rich
record, including a prior diagnosis of intellectual disability when
Matamoros was a teenager that supported all three prongs of the
diagnostic criteria). 285
Despite the apparent disingenuity of the state court’s order,
both the district court and the Fifth Circuit concluded that
Matamoros had not shown that the Court of Criminal Appeals was
“unreasonable in concluding that [he] did not meet his burden” of

Denkowski was a “go to” expert witness, and he was retained by Texas
prosecutors and attorneys general in numerous capital cases where death
sentenced inmates asserted they were persons with intellectual disability and in
every case he determined that the death row inmate did not meet the criteria for
intellectual disability) [https://perma.cc/LSG5-KLZK].
282. See Matamoros v. Stephen, 783 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating
that the federal court stayed the proceedings so Matamoros could exhaust his
Atkins claim in state court).
283. See id. (stating that the state trial court signed and order adopting the
state’s Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
284. Id.
285. See id. at 219 (describing Denkowski’s testimony).
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proving intellectual disability.” 286 Although the court of appeals
acknowledged that the “only competent scientific evidence in the
record” supported a finding of intellectual disability, it concluded
that under AEDPA’s highly deferential regime, the state courts
were free to weigh “observational evidence,” (i.e., that Matamoros
could respond appropriately to external stimuli, lied to protect his
own interests and committed crimes requiring forethought) “more
heavily than it weighed the scientific and expert reports presented
by Matamoros.” 287 The Court of Appeals noted that while the
standard of review often has little effect on the outcome of a case,
Matamoros’ was “not one of those cases” and his claim failed
because of AEDPA’s strict limitations on habeas relief. 288
It is true that the majority of the egregious cases arise in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (which is where most of the cases are
given that the states in those circuits are in the heart of America’s
death belt), 289 but AEDPA’s perceived limits on federal review of
state court judgments has led to losses in meritorious Atkins
claims in other federal courts of appeal as well. Pizzuto v.

286. See id. at 226 (holding that law will only grant Matamoros relief if he
was able to prove that the Court of Criminal Appeals was unreasonable in
concluding that he did not show that he is intellectually disabled).
287. See id. (explaining what the state court was permitted to do under the
Briseno framework).
288. See id. at 226 (explaining why Matamoros failed to prove that he was
intellectually disabled as the term defined by Briseno).
289. Two more cases, one from Florida and one from Texas, are worth briefly
mentioning (and many others would be as well space permitting). See Arbelaez v.
Florida Dep’t of Corr., 662 Fed. App’x 713 (11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a strong
claim of intellectual disability because of state expert who based testimony on
interview rather than information provided by the defendant’s family, friend,
teachers and employers); Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 Fed. App’x 531 (5th Cir.
2013) (sentencing inmate to death despite several IQ measures that showed his
IQ was below 70 and stating that he could not count money, could not use public
transportation, could not follow directions, did not maintain his personal hygiene,
never lived independently, and could not perform even many menial jobs); see also
Sheri L. Johnson, A Legal Obituary for Ramiro, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291
(2016) (providing examples of the Fifth Circuit pushing the ethical bounds of the
law).
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Blades, 290 is a noteworthy example. 291 Gerald Pizzuto was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Idaho. In state
collateral proceedings he raised a claim of intellectual disability
and proffered an expert report indicating he had a measured IQ
score of seventy-two, but the state court dismissed the claim
without even granting him a hearing on the basis that his IQ was
above Idaho’s cutoff of seventy. 292 A panel of the Ninth Circuit
rejected his claim on the basis that no “clearly established”
Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state court
adjudication of his claim forbade the type of IQ cutoff the Idaho
courts invoked in Pizzuto’s case. 293 The circuit court stated that
although it is now clear that the Idaho state courts’ treatment of
his claim was irreconcilable with Supreme Court precedent (and
clinical standards), it was not “beyond fairminded disagreement in
2008,” and was “not so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 294
3. Ignoring State Court Deviations From Clinical Consensus
But perhaps the case that “takes the cake” so to speak, is that
of Danny Hill, an Ohio death row inmate. 295 Prior to the Atkins’
290. See Pizzuto v. Blades, 933 F.3d 1166, 1189 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that
habeus relief could not be granted because the record did not establish that the
court’s adjudication of the inmate’s Atkins claim resulted in a decision that met
the contrary and unreasonable standard).
291. See id. (stating that the district court was correct in denying habeas
relief).
292. Se id. (explaining that the minimal IQ for a mental disability is seventy).
293. See id. at 1184 (stating that there is no clearly established Supreme
Court precedent that shows that Idaho’s Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary
to” or involved an “unreasonable application” to it).
294. Id. at 1184; see also Smith v. Duckworth, 824 F.3d. 1233, 1247 (10th Cir.
2016) (describing that Oklahoma’s failure to apply the Flynn effect was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law in light of
Atkins); Jenkins v. Comm’r, 936 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2019) (same).
295. Indeed, in the aftermath of Atkins, Ohio Attorney General Betty
Montgomery said, “Each case is going to have to be scrutinized to see if it’s
legitimate or just a ruse to buy more time by the inmate.” Dan Horn, Claims of
Retardation Likely: Execution Ban Opens New Appeals, THE CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 21, 2002 at A2. The AG was also confident that
none of Ohio’s death row prisoners would be affected by the decision. Id.
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decision itself, there was absolutely no question that Hill was a
person with intellectual disability. He had been diagnosed with
intellectual disability at least ten times over the course of his life. 296
First determined to be a slow learning child at age six, he was
placed in special education classes where he remained for the
entire time he was a student in the public school system. 297 At age
seventeen, he was assessed by an examiner with the juvenile court
system after being arrested for sexual assault and was determined
to be “mildly retarded with very poor adaptive functioning.” 298 At
his capital trial, several experts testified he was a person with
intellectual disability (and none said he was not), and during his
pre-Atkins appeals, courts found that he was, in fact, a person with
intellectual disability. 299 Hill’s case was pending in federal court
when Atkins was decided and the federal courts remanded the case
to the state courts for resolution of what one would have thought
would have been a straightforward and very simple question:
whether Hill’s death sentence should be set aside due to the
creation of the new categorical bar. 300
However, attorneys for the State of Ohio persuaded the judge
to order the experts to focus their inquiry solely on whether Hill
was a person with intellectual disability at the time of the
evaluation. 301 As a result, two of the three evaluating experts
largely ignored the detailed, historical record of Hill’s intellectual
disability, and rendered their opinion based on interviews with
prison guards and Hill himself. 302 The third expert, the only one to
296. See Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th 373, 400 (6th Cir. 2021) (Moore, J.,
dissenting)(stating that Hill has been diagnosed with a mental disability
approximately ten times over the course of his life).
297. See id. at 400–01 (describing when Hill was first diagnosed with an
intellectual disability and how that effected his classes in public school).
298. See id. at 401 (stating that Hill was still intellectually disabled at the age
of seventeen when he was assessed again).
299. See id. at 417 (listing several times when Hill was found to have an
intellectual disability).
300. See id. at 383 (majority opinion) (detailing the procedural history).
301. See id. at 411 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Both experts, instead, assessed
Hill’s adaptive skills as they existed at the time of the hearing’ — even though
intellectual disability is a static condition.”).
302. See id. (“Drs. Olley and Huntsman leaned heavily on these prison
officials’ testimony rather than treating them with the degree of skepticism
mandated by the medical literature.”).
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review and rely upon the records and to conduct collateral
interviews, concluded that Hill was in fact a person with
intellectual disability. 303 The other two acknowledged that Hill had
significantly, subaverage intellectual functioning (thus satisfying
prong one), but concluded that there was not sufficient information
to say that Hill met prong two at the time of the state court
hearing. 304 The state judge presiding over the matter, relying
primarily on the testimony of the two experts, testimony from
prison correctional officers that Hill was an “average inmate” and
his own observations of Hill in court, found that he was not a
person with intellectual disability, and the Ohio Court of Appeals
affirmed. 305
A panel of the Sixth Circuit initially granted the writ of habeas
corpus, finding that the state court decision was objectively
unreasonable. 306 In the panel’s view, the state courts: a)
overemphasized Hill’s adaptive strengths (as opposed to his
deficits, as required by clinical consensus); and, b) relied too
heavily on his prison behavior. 307 The Sixth Circuit opinion cited
Moore v. Texas, 308 which criticized the TCCA’s judgment for doing
both of those things, and held that Ohio Court of Appeals decision
in Hill—like the TCCA’s decision in Moore—was inconsistent with
Atkins and the clinical consensus understanding of intellectual
disability. 309 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, finding that Atkins itself did not “definitively
resolve” how the adaptive functioning prong was to be assessed,
303. See id. at 412 (“[D]r. Nancy Schmidtgoessling, one of the psychologists
who testified during the mitigation phase of Hill’s trial, assessed Hill’s adaptive
behavior when she diagnosed him as intellectually disabled.”).
304. See id. at 409 (“Dr. Olley described borderline intellectual functioning as
“no mental retardation but it is the . . . functioning that is . . . between one
standard deviation below the mean and two standard deviations below the mean,”
i.e., an IQ range between ‘71 to 85.’”).
305. See id. at 415 (explaining that the records and experts support the trial
court’s conclusion that the second prong was not met).
306. See Hill v. Anderson, 881 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing the
judgment of the district court in respect to Hill’s Atkins claim).
307. See id. at 493 (describing the trial court’s mistake by disregarding
accepted medical practices and relying too heavily on behavioral observations).
308. 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017).
309. See Anderson, 881 F.3d at 486–87 (reversing the judgment of the district
court).
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and that it was improper for the court of appeals to “lean so heavily
on Moore” because it was not “clearly established” at the time of
the state court decision. 310 The remand instructed the panel to
“determine whether its conclusions can be sustained based strictly
on legal rules that were clearly established in the decisions of this
Court at the relevant time, “ 311 thus leaving the possibility that the
Sixth Circuit would affirm its holding, albeit with reasoning
independent of Moore.
On remand, the Sixth Circuit panel once more determined
that Hill was a person with intellectual disability. 312 This time, the
panel focused almost exclusively on defects in the state court factfinding process and the state courts factual determinations in
concluding that Hill was (still) a person with intellectual disability,
and that the state court’s decision to the contrary was an
“unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the evidence
before the state courts. 313 The Ohio Attorney General’s office
petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was granted. The en banc
court, voting strictly along ideological lines, then reinstated Hill’s
death sentence. 314 The en banc majority concluded that it was not
objectively unreasonable for the state court to order the experts to
evaluate Hill’s intellectual abilities at the time of the Atkins’
hearing “given the discretion Atkins left to the states.” 315 When
evaluating the state court factual determination under
§ 2254(d)(2), the majority admitted that there was evidence in the
record that showed Hill had deficits in “adaptive skills such as selfcare, functional academics and self-directions,” and acknowledged
that “another judge could have reached the opposition conclusion”
310. See Shoop v. Hill, 139 S.Ct. 504, 507–08 (2019) (explaining that Atkins
did not completely resolve the issue and such reliance on Moore was
inappropriate).
311. Id. at 509.
312. See Hill v. Anderson, 960 F.3d 260, 265 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated, 964 F.3d
590 (6th Cir. 2021) (“We hold that Hill is intellectually disabled and that he
cannot be sentenced to death.”).
313. See id. at 282–83 (concluding that the state court’s decision amounted to
an incorrect application of general Atkins standards).
314. See Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Nov. 24, 2021) (No. 21-6428) (affirming the district court’s denial of Hill’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
315. See id. at 386 (describing the majority’s rationale in affirming the district
court’s opinion in light of Atkins).
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and found Hill to be a person with intellectual disability, but held
that because the “determination of the Ohio Court of Appeals was
not unreasonable . . . Hill cannot succeed on his Atkins claim.” 316
The dissenting judges meticulously documented the decades of
evidence of Hill’s disability, including the multiple prior diagnoses
and judicial findings all finding Hill to be a person with intellectual
disability and concluded that that “the evidence that Hill is
intellectually disabled is overwhelming.” 317 After deconstructing
the state court opinion and exposing the factual cherry-picking and
reliance on stereotypes of persons with intellectual disability, the
dissenters objected that “[n]o person looking at this record could
reasonably deny that Hill is intellectually disabled under
Atkins.” 318
In sum, while federal habeas review has resulted in some
persons with intellectual disability being spared execution or given
another opportunity to present their claim to the state courts, 319
overall, it has been a woefully inadequate check on recalcitrant
state courts. The restrictions on the habeas remedy created by the
Supreme Court, especially in the hands of many members of the
federal judiciary who will adjudicate the cases and who are all to
willing to overlook a state court’s rejection of a clearly meritorious
claim, ensures that a not insignificant number of persons with
intellectual disability will be executed.

316. See id. at 394–95 (conceding that there were facts and circumstances
present that could lead to a different outcome in favor of Hill).
317. See id. at 418 (Moore, J, dissenting) (identifying the large amount of
evidence that supported Hill’s claims that he was intellectually disabled).
318. Id. at 400.
319. See Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 307 (2015) (granting habeas relief
because the state court’s refusal to fully consider an Atkins claim was an
unreasonable determination of fact); Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 597 (6th
Cir. 2014) (granting relief because the state court’s application of Atkins was
contrary to federal law); Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248, 270 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the state court’s finding that petitioner did not live with intellectual
disability was an unreasonable determination of fact); Smith v. Sharp, 935 F.3d
1064, 1083 (10th Cir. 2019) (granting habeas relief because the state court either
made unreasonable determinations of fact or unreasonably applied Atkins).
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V. Conclusion
We have applauded and continue to applaud the Court for
creating a categorical bar to the execution of persons with
intellectual disability. Atkins has spared many lives. But it was
never intended to apply only in some states, or to some persons
with intellectual disability; the purpose of the rule was to protect
all persons with intellectual disability in all states that retain the
death penalty, from the “risk of wrongful execution.” 320 But, for the
reasons we have discussed in this article, twenty years after
Atkins, there is not just the risk, but the certainty of continued
wrongful executions. Those wrongful executions will continue to
happen as long as legislatures and courts, including the Court that
created the bar, tolerate the procedural and substantive obstacles
created by state courts, and the parsimonious federal habeas
review of state court decisions rejecting very strong claims of
intellectual disability.

320. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (“Mentally retarded defendants
in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.”).

